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Overview
Overview
This doctoral thesis contributes to the political economy of institutions, and
focuses in particular on political interactions between economic and demo-
graphic factors. We are especially interested in the social conicts arising
among intergenerational groups, specically young, adults and old. While
these groups can be di¤erentiated on the basis of their economic character-
istics, demographic dynamics are also at work when these interactions are
considered. This research will address these questions from a theoretical
perspective where policy prescriptions will also be outlined.
Focusing on intergenerational conict and the interaction among socio-
demographic variables, economic institutions, political institutions and macro-
economic outcomes, this work can be divided into two lines.
The rst line of this research focuses on the impact of intergenerational
conict for technology adoption and, consequently, for economic growth, in
the presence of endogenous evolution of life expectancy. The idea is to join
together, into a unique theoretical framework, two important recent research
strands within the eld of political economy: the one that studies the inter-
action among demographic variables, with special focus on life expectancy
evolution and economic growth, and the one that investigates the political
mechanism that drives the economy toward di¤erent innovation policies.
Specically, Chapter 1 presents A Politico-Economic Model of Aging,
Technology Adoption and Growth. This model provides a positive theory
that explains how an economy evolves when the longevity of its citizens is
jointly determined with the process of economic development. We propose
a three periods OLG politico-economic model with human capital accumu-
lation. Agentsdecisions embrace two dimensions: the private choice about
education and the public one upon innovation policy. Analyzing an eco-
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nomic model in which endogenous changes in life expectancy, education,
technological improvements and economic growth interact with each other,
we nd that (a) poverty traps can arise in the accumulation process of hu-
man capital and have long-lasting e¤ects on aggregate output; (b) at the
individual level a higher life expectancy increases the incentive to innovate
for both young and adults; (c) at the aggregate level di¤erent political con-
gurations can arise depending on endogenous demographic structures; (d)
depending on initial conditions and parameter values, in the long run both
"Innovation" and "No Innovation" can be feasible steady states.
The second part of this research develops a theoretical investigation of
the interactions between demographic conict and the di¤erential perfor-
mance of political institutions. We focus on the role of intergenerational
conict for the determination of both the size of the State and the redis-
tribution programs adopted, in the presence of endogenous human capital
production and of an aging society. This work relies on the dynamic po-
litical economy literature that incorporates forward-looking decision makers
in a multidimensional policy space without commitment. In particular this
work relates to two main streams of literature. On the one hand, it supports
and gives new theoretical fundamentals to the existing literature on social
security sustainability, which recognizes the link between productive and re-
distributive public spending. On the other hand, this part also contributes to
the growing literature on dynamic politico-economic models. Starting from
the seminal work of Krusell et al. (1997)1, the main interesting issue in the
dynamic political economy literature concerns the modeling of economies
where endogenous dynamic feedbacks between private and political choices
are explicitly considered. Due to theoretical complexities, to extend stan-
dard static models to encompass fully dynamic policy-making has proved to
be di¢ cult, even in the case of one-dimensional policy environments both in
the nite- and innite-horizon environment.
Chapter 2 presents A Dynamic Politico-Economic Model of Intergener-
ational Contractsthat investigates the conditions for the emergence of im-
plicit intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms,
commitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic
politico-economic model in an OLG environment where politicians play
1Krussell, P., Quadrini, V. and Rìoss-Rull, J. V., 1997, "Politico-Economic Equilibrium
and Economic Growth", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, 243  272.
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Markovian strategies in a probabilistic voting environment, setting multi-
dimensional political agenda. Both backward and forward intergenerational
transfers, respectively in the form of pension benets and higher education
investments, are simultaneously considered in an endogenous human capital
setting with distortionary income taxation. On the one hand, social security
sustains investment in public education; on the other hand investment in ed-
ucation creates a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and
physical capital, driving the economy toward di¤erent welfare state regimes.
Embedding a repeated-voting setup of electoral competition, we nd that
under the dynamic e¢ ciency scenario both forward and backward intergen-
erational transfers simultaneously arise.
Chapter 3 presents "Time Consistent Public Expenditure with Intergen-
erational Exchange". In this chapter, we study the optimal choice of in-
tergenerational public expenditures when there is no way of committing to
future policy and reputationalmechanisms are not operative. Restricting
our attention to Markov equilibria, as in the previous chapter, we solve for a
dynamic game between successive governments and the private sector, whose
underlying state variables are the physical and the human capital stocks.
We characterize equilibria in terms of an intertemporal rst-order condition
- Generalized Euler Equation - for the government using the methodology
proposed by Krusell et al. (2008) and we base analytical computations
on it. Comparing the resulting optimal public expenditure level with the
politico-economic equilibrium in probabilistic voting environment, we nd
that: The equilibrium allocation is education e¢ cient but, due to political
overrepresentation of the elderly, the electoral competition process induces
overtaxation compared with a time-consistent Central Planner solution with
balanced welfare weights.
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Chapter 1
A Politico-Economic Model
of Aging, Technology
Adoption and Growth
The political economy of technological change is only dimly understood.
[...] the vigor of youth is followed by the caution of maturity and nally the
feebleness of old age. [...] If we are to understand why the res of innovation
die down, we must propose a model in which technological progress creates
the condition for its own demise. (Mokyr 1990 : 261 )
1.1 Introduction
Over the last two centuries the Western world has experienced an extraor-
dinary change in the economic environment and in all aspects of human life.
During this period, OECD countries have been characterized by dramatic
improvements in economic conditions, the longevity of their population and
education attainments. Simultaneously, the traditional social structure has
greatly changed: the share of both schooling age and retired people has in-
creased signicantly and, as a consequence, the proportion of the working
population has shrunk.
Some specic facts provide a better description of this evolution. In the
last one hundred and fty years life expectancy has increased tremendously.
Focusing on the US, it shifted from less than 60 years (Lee, 2001) in 1850, to
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almost 80 years today (Fogel, 1994). At the same time, both the portion of
lifetime devoted to education and retirement have increased. In 1850 about
10% of the population was enrolled in primary school and, on average, the
time devoted to education was negligible. Considering both formal and
informal schooling (domestic education), people now study for around 20
years, about a quarter of their expected lifetime. The length of time spent in
retirement shows a similar trend. In 1850, less than three years were devoted
to retirement. Today, especially in Europe due to the introduction of social
security systems after World War II, people enjoy retirement for almost 20
years: again, one quarter of their lifetime (Latulippe, 1996). Figure 1:1
shows how life expectancy and its composition, in terms of agentseconomic
roles, have evolved between 1850 and 1990 in the United States.1 This trend
is even more evident in the case of Europe: in particular, life expectancy has
grown more rapidly (surpassing the United States). It was around 40 years
in England in 1850, while today it has reached almost 80 years (Galor, 2005).
The length of retirement has increased even more.2
Figure 1:1. Life expectancy and economic roles in the US.
One of the main implications of this trend is that the socio-demographic
1Figure 1:1 plots the average length of life and the distribution of time spent in edu-
cating, working and retiring for a 20-years-old person for the United States. Source: Lee
(2001) and www.bls.gov.
2For European data see Galasso and Profeta (2004).
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structure of developed and, to some extent, developing countries are expe-
riencing important changes. This movement creates a system in which the
preferences of both young and old people are becoming more and more im-
portant in the political debate competing with the traditional interests of
adult workers. We observe the transition from a sort of "workersdictator-
ship" - dened as a situation where the mass of the workers represents a
large majority in the population - to a more diluted political representation.
The purpose of this work is to provide an investigation of how an econ-
omy evolves when life expectancy a¤ects both individual and aggregate pref-
erences concerning the production side of the economy and, therefore, the
growth process. We propose a three periods OLG model where agents, dur-
ing their lifetime, cover di¤erent economic roles characterized by di¤erent
time horizons and, consequently, incentive structures. Agentsdecisions em-
brace two dimensions: the private choice about education and the public one
related to innovation policy. The theory focuses on the crucial role played
by heterogeneous interests in determining innovation policies.
Our model economy does not create new technologies; it simply adopts
those that are already disposable. The adoption process is costly. We refer
to a systemic innovation as to a type of innovation that, in order to be im-
plemented, has to pass through the endorsement of a political mechanism,
where, in general, the interests of di¤erent groups of agents do not coincide.
In our framework the contrast evolves among di¤erent age groups. The pub-
lic nature of systemic innovation, in contrast with the Schumpeterian view of
innovations developed by rms running for the best cost-saving technology,
comes from the historical point of view according to which the implementa-
tion of a new technology is rarely the outcome of pure prot-maximization
by rms. Following Mokyr (1998a; 2002) and Olson (1982), in this study
we focus our attention on systemic innovation as a growth-enhancing tech-
nology. Bauer (1995) points out that a decentralized market outcome seems
to be a poor description of many technology breakthroughs. Economic con-
venience is certainly not irrelevant, but, as Mokyr (1998a) suggests, "there
usually is, at some level, a non-market institution that has to approve, li-
cense or provide some other imprimatur without which rms cannot change
their production methods. The market test by itself is not always enough. In
the past, it almost never was." (p. 219) Thus, as reported by Olson (1982),
the decision whether to adopt a new technology is likely to be resisted by
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those who lose by it through some kind of activism aimed at inuencing the
decision by the above-mentioned institutions.
Consequently, we construct a model in which technology adoption is
delegated to a regulatory institution, the democratic vote. We formalize the
idea that an innovation, before being introduced in large-scale production,
has to be approved by some non-market institution.3 Its adoption is ex-
post disposable for all individuals in the economy, but ex-ante the choice
to adopt it or not can be a¤ected by the interests of di¤erent age groups.4
To capture the evolving clash between resistive and innovative interests,
we consider an economy that, at any point in time, is populated by three
di¤erent overlapping groups of agents. In fact, besides the increasing human
capital accumulation, productivity improvements come from the innovation
process. A systemic innovation is implemented if and only if there is a
political consensus for it: because its net benets are not spread equally
among the di¤erent age classes, in a heterogeneous setting there is always
room for suboptimal provision of the innovation itself. According to Krusell
and Ríos-Rull (1996) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1998), we assume that
the public choice is carried out by means of a democratic majority voting
where the interests of the absolute majority of the population prevail.
We nd that a conict of interests on which technology to adopt will
arise between workers and students, on one side, and retired people, on the
other. If the former will tend to support innovations, the latter are likely
to resist technological change given that their income is not related to the
current technology but rather to the previous innovation cycle. Another po-
tential conict opposes young people to adults. For the youngest cohort, an
innovation has long lasting e¤ects, since it a¤ects both their future produc-
tivity in the labour market and their childrens future capacity to acquire
human capital. For the adults, however, a new technology will only have an
3We assume that there is no uncertainty in the outcome of a new technology: once the
decision to shift to the new technology is undertaken, with probability one a productivity
enhancement takes place. It follows that we are not dealing with the risky process of
producing new ideas, but with the process of implementing existing ideas in new ways
that are more e¢ cient, although not for everybody in the same way.
4According to Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005), the central authority can be seen as a
licensing system that has some agency to approve new technologies before they are brought
to the market. Again in Mokyr (1998a)s words: "almost everywhere some kind of non-
marketing control and licensing has been introduced". A recent example is the creation
of standard-setting agencies such as the International Organization of Standardization
(ISO).
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e¤ect on the ability of future generations to nance their pension. These
di¤erent incentive structures would hardly coincide.
This paper contributes to two important recent research strands within
the eld of economic growth: life expectancy and growth (e. g. Blackburn
and Cipriani (2002), Chakraborty (2004), Cervellati and Sunde (2005))5 and
vested interest and growth (e. g. Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), Canton et
al. (2002), Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005)).6 Building on the existing lit-
erature, this paper analyzes an economic model in which the interactions
among endogenous changes in life expectancy, education, technological im-
provements and economic growth, suggest that (a) poverty traps can arise
in the accumulation process of human capital and have long-lasting e¤ects
on aggregate output; (b) at the individual level a higher life expectancy
increases the incentive to innovate for both young and adults; (c) at the
aggregate level di¤erent congurations can arise depending on endogenous
demographic structures; (d) depending on initial conditions and parameter
values in the long run both "Innovation" and "No Innovation" can be feasi-
ble steady state. Due to interplay between demographic structures and the
private incentives that endogenously change, the transition path to steady
states can be characterized by three switches between "No Innovation" and
"Innovation" regimes.
5The important role played by life expectancy in determining the optimal education
decisions of individuals has already been pointed out by models that analyze the relation-
ship between demographic variables and development. In a recent study, Blackburn and
Cipriani (2002) endogenize life expectancy. As a result, their model generates multiple
development regimes depending on initial conditions. Endogenizing life expectancy allows
Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) to explain jointly the main changes that take place during
the demographic transition of economies, such as greater life expectancy, higher levels of
education, lower fertility and later timing of births. Cervellati and Sunde (2005) analyze
a model in which human capital formation, technological progress and life expectancy are
endogenously determined and reinforce each other. In a microfounded theory the authors
show that the inclusion of endogenous life expectancy helps to explain the long-term de-
velopment of economies and, in particular, the industrial revolution experienced by many
countries as an endogenous result in the process of development. Chakraborty (2004)
also endogenizes life expectancy and assumes that the survival probability depends on the
public investment in health. In his model low life expectancy is detrimental for growth
because on the one hand, low expectations of surviving make individuals less patient and
willing to save and invest and, on the other hand, lower life expectancy also reduces the
returns of investing in education. See Galor (2005) for an overview on the literature.
6To the best of our knowledge only Canton et al. (2002) have analyzed the relationship
between vested interest and economic growth with the focus on the role played by an
aging population in determining the optimal technology adoption. The authors argue
that when older people face a higher cost of adopting new technologies, political pressure
in a democratic system may slow down innovation adoption in an ageing society.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 1:2 we present the mechanics
of the model, describing the economic environment and solving both the
individual education problem and the aggregate innovation one. Section 1:3
concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N: The economy is populated by a nite
number of overlapping generations of homogeneous agents. Each generation
consists of a unit mass of individuals (Nt = N = 1) living up to three periods.
Every agent born at time t survives with probability one from youth to
adulthood and with probability pt+2 to old age. When people of generation
t are young they split their unit time endowment between schooling (et) and
working as unskilled (1  et). Their income comes from their productivity
multiplied by time spent working. An innovation cost has to be paid today
to implement a new technology in the next period. This innovation cost is
a xed share of income and takes the values i 2 (0; 1) or zero in case the
innovation is decided or not, respectively. We dene the indicator function
of it, denoted by  (it), as follows:
 (it) =
(
1
0
if
if
it = i
it = 0
:
Each adult works as skilled and has a single child. Adultshuman capital
is a function of average human capital of the previous period and the e¤ort
they made when young. They produce combining their human capital with
a TFP parameter that increases if a new technology is endorsed the period
before. This income is divided between consumption, a constant share s
that goes, in a PAYGO fashion, in paying their parentspensions7 and, in
case, the innovation cost it+1. When old, they consume the pension that
their children pass to them, net of the innovation cost it+2. The scheme of
the timing for an agent born at time t is represented in Figure 1:2.
7We do not discuss the way in which the pension system is implemented and if it can
be politically self-sustaining as, among others, Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) do. We
assume that a commitment between generations is in place and no one can default on it.
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Born with Ht
Votes over it
Chooses et
Consumes ct
Technology At+1 is in place
ht+1 is achieved
Votes over it+1
Consumes ct+1
Votes over it+2
Gets Pt+2
Consumes ct+2Pass syt+1
Figure 1:2. Timing for an agent born at time t.
In every period, adult agents individually produce a single homogenous
good employing human capital as the sole input, using the publicly available
technology At. Agents political lever is characterized by their ability to
vote, every period of their life, for a systemic innovation to be implemented
in the next period. We replicate the stylized facts that young people show
a lower turnout rate at elections dened as the percentage of people who
actually vote among those having the right to with respect to adults and
old.8 Thus, youngs weight in the political process is represented by an
exogenous parameter  2 (0; 1]. All adults and old vote at each period t, so
their measure is 1 and pt, respectively, where pt is the share of old alive.
1.2.1 Production by Skilled Adults
Each skilled adult produces a homogenous private good using a decreasing
return function of human capital, combined with the available technology
vintage. The production function at time t is:9
yt = Ath

t (1.1)
8As Galasso and Profeta (2004) report, not all potential electors actually vote. In
some countries, elderly voters have a higher turnout rate at elections than the young, thus
leading to an overrepresentation of the elderly. This voting pattern is strongest in the
US, where turnout rates among those aged 60  69 years is twice as high as among the
young (18 29 years). Signicant di¤erences appear also in other countries: in France,
the turnout rate of the elderly (60 69 years) is almost 50% higher than that of the young
(18 29 years).
9Since Nt = N = 1 the aggregate production function at time t, Yt, is Yt = yt.
8 Chapter 1
where  2 (0; 1) : ht is adult endowment of human capital and At is the
technological coe¢ cient. Changes in At reect therefore TFP changes. The
level of technology employed at time t in the production of output, At,
depends on the political choice of the previous period (t  1). The TFP
parameter At is equal to At 1 in case a new technology is not implemented
(i.e.  (it 1) = 0), while At = (1 + )At 1 in case a new technology is im-
plemented (i.e.  (it 1) = 1). At time t = 0, A0 = A > 0. A compact
formulation for the dynamic evolution of technology parameter, At+1, is
At+1 = (1 +  (it))At (1.2)
where  denotes the growth rate of the technology and is a strictly positive
scalar.
1.2.2 Investment in Human Capital
In the rst period of her life, a member of generation t invests in human
capital. The acquisition of skills requires the individuals e¤ort in schooling
and a stock of existing human capital, whose average level is HtNt = Ht
because Nt = 1. The elasticity of past human capital in the production of
new human capital is ". The human capital that an adult gets at time t+1;
ht+1, is:
ht+1 = (et;Ht; it)   ((1   (it)) etHt ) (1.3)
where  is a scale parameter. The properties of the production function of
human capital are as follows:
1. The individualslevel of human capital is an increasing function of the
individuals e¤ort in schooling

i.e. @@et (et;Ht; it) > 0

:
The importance and the empirical signicance of the individuals ef-
fort in schooling inputs is well documented in the literature. For a
comprehensive survey of the related literature see Mincer (1974).
2. The individualslevel of human capital is an increasing function of the
parental level of human capital

i.e. @@Ht (et;Ht; it) > 0

:
The importance of the parental education input in the formation of
the human capital of the child has been explored theoretically as well
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as empirically. The empirical signicance of the parental e¤ects has
been documented by Becker and Tomes (1986), as well as others.
3. There exist diminishing returns to the parental human capital e¤ect
i.e.

@2
@H2t
(et;Ht; it) < 0

:
4. The level of human capital depreciates by a factor (1   ) in case an
innovation is decided at time t.
The assumption is that when new technologies are implemented, hu-
man capital produced in schools based upon previous types of tech-
nology is less useful. The concept of vintage human capital has been
explicitly used in the 90s to treat some specic issues related to tech-
nology di¤usion, inequality and economic demography. In a world with
a continuous pace of innovations, a representative individual faces the
typical question of whether to stick to an established technology or to
move to a new and better one. The trade-o¤ is the following: switch-
ing to the new technique would allow him to employ a more advanced
technology but he would lose the expertise, the specic human capi-
tal, accumulated on the old technique. For a comprehensive survey of
vintage human capital literature see Boucekkine et al. (2006).
5. Ranges for the parameters are  > 0, 0   < 1 and 0 <  < 1.
1.2.3 Utility Function and Budget Constraints
Agents born at time t evaluate consumption according to the following in-
tertemporal, non altruistic, expected utility function dened over the vector
ct   ctt; ctt+1; ctt+2 2 R3:
utt = u
 
ctt

+ u
 
ctt+1

+ pt+2u
 
ctt+2

(1.4)
where ;  2 (0; 1) are the impatient factors for the adult and old age con-
sumption, respectively. pt+2 is the probability to survive until old age. The
function u () is concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable and satises the
Inada condition, i.e. lim
ct!0
uc (ct) = 1. Assume that preferences exhibit
logarithmic form, i.e. u () = log ().
Individualsbudget constraints of agents in the three periods are as fol-
lows.
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ctt  ! (1  et) (1  it) (1.5)
Consumption of a member of generation t at time t, ctt, is the income
generated working as unskilled net of the innovation cost. When young each
agent works as unskilled getting a constant wage, !, that, for simplicity,
we normalize to 1. The time devoted to work is (1  et). Because of the
assumptions Nt = 1 and setting ! = 1, youngs gross income is (1  et).
ctt+1  yt+1 (1  s  it+1) (1.6)
Consumption of a member of generation t at time t + 1, ctt+1, is the
income received in the skilled sector net of the innovation cost and the
pension contribution, required to nance the pension of her parent. s must
satisfy the condition: s < 1  i:
ctt+2  Pt+2 (1  it+2) (1.7)
Consumption of a member of generation t at time t + 2, ctt+2, is the
pension benet net of the innovation cost. In the third period of her life, a
member of generation t receives
P tt+2 =
syt+1t+2
pt+2
=
sAt+2h

t+2
pt+2
(1.8)
The pension is the share s of income that an adult of generation t + 1
disbursed in the PAYGO system, divided by pt+2 that takes into account
the share of people surviving to old age.
Remark 1 Ceteris paribus, the pension benet for an old agent decreases
with the lengthening of life expectancy, i.e. with pt+2.
1.2.4 Individual Optimization with Given Innovation Policy
Agents choose their optimal schooling time when young taking as given the
innovation policy.10 Maximization of Eq. (1:4) subject to the individual
budget constraints (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7), in which we previously plugged
the human capital production function, (1.3), and Eq. (1.8), yields the
10We will add the case of endogenous innovation policy in the paragraph 1:2:6.
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optimal schooling time, et ,
et =
[+ pt+2]
1 + [+ pt+2]
(1.9)
Remark 2 The longer is the life expectancy, the higher is the time invest-
ment needed to nance their prolonged consumption, consistently with exist-
ing literature.11
The positive e¤ect of pt+2 on et arises because agents know that the
only way to get higher pension benets from their children is to invest in
their own education. This, in turns, positively a¤ects their childrens human
capital and, ultimately, their childrens income.
Substituting Eq. (1.9) in Eq. (1.3) and writing ht instead of Ht (since
in equilibrium ht = Ht=Nt and by assumption Nt = 1) we get the accumula-
tion function of human capital as a function of the previous level of human
capital, the innovation policy chosen the period before and the fraction of
time young spend in education. We obtain:
ht+1 =  (1   (it)) [+ pt+2]
1 + [+ pt+2]
ht (1.10)
The human capital accumulation function shows a concave shape (given
that 0 <  < 1) and undergoes a reduction in case an innovation takes place
(i.e.  (it) = 1).
1.2.5 Endogenous life expectancy
In this subsection we allow for the level of life expectancy to increase with the
aggregate human capital level.12 For an agent born at time t the probability
to reach old age is, therefore, pt+2 = p (Ht). We impose some restrictions on
p (H), in order to get simple results. p (0) = pL > 0 avoids the extreme case
of a disappearing old age, while @p(H)@H  0 replicates the empirical evidence
of a positive correlation between life expectancy and human capital.13 Since
11The positive e¤ect of longevity on education is emphasized by Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Chakraborty (2004) and Cervellati and Sunde (2005). For further evidence on
the e¤ect of health and living conditions on education attainments, see De la Croix and
Licandro (1999), Lagerlof (2003) and Galor (2005).
12As in, among others, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Boucekkine et al. (2002), Cervel-
lati and Sunde (2005).
13Empirically, both private and aggregate endowment of human capital are conductive
to a longer life, although we focus on the aggregate view: on the one hand, demographic
12 Chapter 1
p is a probability, we assume that limH!+1 p (H) = pH  1. For simplicity,
we set pH = 1. Simple algebra and the identity ht  Ht allow us to rewrite
the expression of human capital accumulation, (1.10), as follows:
ht+1 =   (ht; it)h

t
The function   always takes positive values, is non decreasing in h
( 1 (ht; it)  0) and, for the restrictions imposed on the function p, is limited
from above by some nite number.
Proposition 1 For a given it it is always possible to explicitly nd a contin-
uous increasing function   (ht; it) such that ht+1 =   (ht; it)ht shows multi-
ple steady states.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Figure.1:3. Human capital Equilibrium in the case of Innovation, Panel (a), and no Inn., Panel (b):
and historical evidence suggests that the level of human capital profoundly a¤ect the
longevity of people. For example, the evidence presented by Mirowsky and Ross (1998)
supports strongly the notions that better educated people are more able to coalesce health-
producing behaviour into a coherent lifestyle, are more motivated to adopt such behaviour
by a greater sense of control over the outcomes in their own lives, and are more likely to
inspire the same type of behaviour in their children. Schultz (1993, 1998) evidences that
childrens life expectancy increases with parents human capital and education. On the
other hand, there is evidence that the human capital intensive inventions of new drugs
increases life expectancy (Lichtenberg, 1998, 2003) and societies endowed with an higher
level of human capital are more likely to innovate, especially in research elds like medicine
(Mokyr, 1998b).
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In Figure 1:3 we show the peculiar case in which the introduction of an
innovation leads the economy from a unique steady state case to a multiple
steady state one. Panel (a) highlights the case of innovation (i.e. it = i). hS1
and hS2 are stable equilibria, while hU1 is the unstable, positive one. Relying
on the concept of vintage human capital described above, the whole graph of
ht+1 lies below the one of no innovation. It can be, therefore, the case that
if innovation takes place there is room, due to the depreciation of human
capital, for two stable steady states, while in the case of no innovation only
one stable steady state occurs. Panel (b) shows the case of no innovation
(i.e. it = 0). The graph of ht+1 is higher and only one stable steady state,
hS3, arises.
Apart from the innovation policy, increases in the weight of both adult
() and old age () consumption, the constant of proportionality (), the
productivity of human capital in nal good production () and the elasticity
of past human capital in the production of new human capital () shift ht+1
upward, leading both to higher level of human capital for any steady state
and, in case, to the disappearance of the low steady state, hS1 in Figure 3.
Remark 3 The fact that (i) the growth of human capital is bounded and (ii)
human capital is the only factor of production and its accumulation function
does not depend upon the level of the TFP parameter allows us to study, in
an "additive" way, how human capital and production evolve.
For example, once human capital reaches a steady state, using Eq. (1.1)
we can keep track of the nal production looking solely at the innovation
policy undertaken. Therefore the steady state production is a constant level
in the case of no innovation, y = A0
 
hS

, while it will increase at the
constant rate  in the case of innovation, yt = A0 (1 + )
t  hS . The value
hS represents one of the stable steady states reached by the human capital
function.
1.2.6 Endogenous Innovation Policy: Aggregation Rule and
Individual Choices
In this section we endogenize the process of technology adoption by means of
a majority voting mechanism. At every point in time the agents belonging
to the three age classes vote for a new technology to be implemented in
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the next period. The decision to adopt a new technology is endorsed if the
majority of agents votes in favor of it.14 At time t young of generation t,
adults of generation (t  1) and (survived) old born at time (t  2) are alive.
Their political weights, whose sum is normalized to one, are

 + 1 + pt
,
1
 + 1 + pt
and
pt
 + 1 + pt
,
respectively.
Remark 4 The longer the life expectancy is, the larger is the political weight
of old and the smaller is that of both young and adults.
Lemma 1 For values of olds life expectancy pt smaller than the threshold
pO:
pt < p
O = 1  
a "workers dictatorship" arises at time t: no matter what young and old
prefer, adults alone will set the agenda in terms of innovation. There are no
values of pt such that another age class alone can decide upon innovation.
Proof. (See Appendix).
In the early stages of development
 
i.e. pt < pO

the political power is,
therefore, in the hands of adult alone. Meanwhile the accumulation of human
capital leads to longer life expectancy and ultimately to smaller shares of
both young and adults. Once pt reaches and exceeds pO decisions about
innovation cannot be supported by adults alone. In order to implement
a new technology, the economy needs the consensus of at least two age
classes. We call this subsequent stage of development "diluted power". Note
that the specic cost-benet setup of the innovation implies that old people
are always against innovation: they are supposed to pay today a fraction of
their income for a new technology that will be available once they are dead.
In the case of "workers dictatorship" this feature is not inuential, since
adults have the absolute majority. On the contrary in the case of pt > pO
an innovation is implemented if and only if both young and adults vote in
favor of a progressive policy.15 Therefore, if either young, adults or both
14 It is possible to restate the mechanism of deciding upon technology adoption in terms
of median voter, but we nd this approach very clear and intuitive.
15With progressive policy we indicate the adoption of a new technology. Conversely,
conservative policy means no adoption.
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these age classes vote against innovation, a conservative policy will be put
in place.
Denition 1 vjt is the individual preference over the innovation policy voted
by an agent of age j at time t (with j 2 fY ;A;Og standing for young, adults
and old, respectively). vjt can take the states f; g, indicating a vote in favor
of innovation and a vote against innovation, respectively.
Note that olds choice is always to vote against innovation, as will be
shown below: vOt = ;8t 2 N. The function Mt aggregates the votes of the
three generations alive at time t and its outcome is the majority choice:
Mt(v
Y
t ; v
A
t ; v
O
t ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
I if
(
vYt = v
A
t =  and pt  pO
vAt =  and pt < p
O
N otherwise
(1.11)
WheneverMt = I the innovation cost applies to every agent alive at time
t and the new technology At+1 is disposable at time (t+ 1). Conversely,
if Mt = N agents do not pay any innovation cost and they produce, at
time (t+ 1), with technology At. The majority choice Mt = fI;Ng maps,
through the biunivocal function it = i (Mt), into the set f0; ig.
In order to have an intertemporal voting equilibrium it is required that,
in every period, agents optimally choose the innovation policy, taking future
outcomes as given. Since people live up to three periods, young face three-
period sequences of policies, adults two-periods ones and old have just one
policy choice to do.16
Now we turn to the analysis of how each age class votes taking into ac-
count the optimal future political and economic choices. An agent belonging
to age class j at time t bases her choice on the di¤erence between the utility
she gets in the case she votes in favor or against innovation. The stream
16Being the two values of policy variable M = fI;Ng ("innovation" and "no in-
novation", respectively), young born at time t face eight possible streams of poli-
cies: fIt; It+1; It+2g; fIt; It+1;Nt+2g; fIt;Nt+1; It+2g; fIt;Nt+1;Nt+2g; fNt; It+1; It+2g;
fNt; It+1;Nt+2g; fNt;Nt+1; It+2g; fNt;Nt+1;Nt+2g. Adults at time t face four possible
streams: fIt; It+1g; fIt;Nt+1g; fNt; It+1g; fNt;Nt+1g. Old people just face the decision
fItg or fNtg.
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of future majority choices and outcomes over which the agent forms cor-
rect expectations is Vt+1 = fMt+1; et+1;Mt+2; et+2; :::g. For every age class
j 2 fY ;A;Og we dene the di¤erential utility as
ujt (Vt+1) = u
j
t

vjt = ;Vt+1

  ujt

vjt = ;Vt+1

that collapses to
ujt (Vt+1) = u
j
t

vjt = 

  ujt

vjt = 

because of the specication of the utility function described above. In fact,
the outcome of future innovation policies and educational choices do not
inuence agents di¤erential utility: income and substitution e¤ects of the
innovation cost cancel out. Since at the beginning of their life agents cannot
commit themselves to a specic stream of votes, at each moment in time
each of them votes to maximize her expected future lifetime utility. For a
young agent born at time t the expected future lifetime utility is
uYt = log c
t
t +  log c
t
t+1 + pt+2 log c
t
t+2 (1.12)
that coincides with Eq. (1:4). Expected future lifetime utility for an adult
born at time (t  1) is dened as
uAt =  log c
t 1
t + pt+1 log c
t 1
t+1 (1.13)
while the one of an old agent born at time (t  2) is
uOt =  log c
t 2
t (1.14)
In the last expression the probability pt does not appear because only sur-
vived old choose. The single age classes choose how to vote as follows.
Old Old people, in the case of a progressive policy, only incur in costs:
once the new technology is in place, they will be dead. Their di¤erential
utility is therefore
uOt = u
O
t
 
vOt = 
  uOt  vOt =  =  log (1  i) < 0;8i 2 (0; 1)
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where we plugged Eq. (1.7) and Eq. (1.8) into Eq. (1.14).
Remark 5 Olds optimal choice is to always vote against innovation.
Adults When adult, agents vote over the innovation that will be imple-
mented the next period. As described above, their di¤erential utility de-
pends only on present innovation choices.
uAt = u
A
t
 
vAt = 
  uAt  vAt =  (1.15)
By substituting Eq. (1.6), (1.7), (1.10) and (1.13) into (1.15), we get:
uAt (pt+1) =  log (1  i  s)+pt+1 log (1 + )
+pt+1 log (1  )  log (1  s) (1.16)
The rst and fourth terms jointly show the di¤erential negative impact of
the innovation cost on the net income when adult: in the case of innovation
the share of income going to nance adult age consumption shrinks. The
second term represents the gain in productivity attached to the pension
income when old, weighted by the probability to survive. The third term is
the negative impact of an innovation on the stock of human capital acquired
by adults child: this translates in smaller pensions benets for the adult
herself when old.
Let us assume from now on that
(1 + ) (1  ) > 1 ()  > (1  )    1 (1.17)
This condition on the relative magnitude of TFP improving parameter and
human capital depreciation parameter states that the productivity improve-
ments in the production of nal good () exceeds an increasing function of
both the rate of depreciation of the human capital in the case of innovation
() and its productivity in the production of the nal good (). We rewrite
(1.16) in a compact way, since it will be useful in the next subsection.
Remark 6 Adultsdi¤erential utility can be represented by a linear positive
relation linking uA to p, dropping the time index for simplicity:
uA (p) = mA (; ; ; ) p+ qA (s; i; ) (1.18)
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where mA =  log ((1 + ) (1  )) and qA =  log

1 s i
1 s

.
Lemma 2 Adults vote for the adoption of a new technology if and only if
they achieve a life expectancy pt+1 larger than the threshold pA, dened as
pA =
 log

1 s
1 s i

 log ((1 + ) (1  )) (1.19)
Conversely, if pt+1 < pA, they are against.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Adults vote for an innovation if and only if they will get higher resources
(net of innovation costs) when old, in the form of pensions paid by their
adult children. The threshold pA is a positive function of i: the more expen-
sive is the adoption of a new innovation, the less the adult will be innovation-
prone. The same consideration holds for : due to the adoption of a new
technology, the more the human capital depreciates, the less the adult will
be in favour of implementing the new technology itself. Conversely, higher
growth rates of TFP make adults to prefer innovations. Note that the elas-
ticity of past human capital in the production of the new human capital ()
is not involved in adults decisions: we will see below that only young take
into account how the past level of human capital a¤ects the next periods
human capital accumulation. The higher the share of adults income going
to nance olds pensions is (s), the less the adult will be innovation-prone.
The higher is the preference for adult age consumption (), the more they
will be against innovation. Conversely, preference for old age consumption
() leads to preference for innovation. This is because of the structure of
innovative process: it is a cost today and it gives benets tomorrow. Lastly,
an increase in the elasticity of human capital in the production of nal good
() works against innovation: innovation makes part of the human capital
achieved during youth to depreciate, and the higher its e¤ectiveness in pro-
duction is, the higher the loss is in terms of pensions paid by adultsadult
children.
Young Young vote over innovation taking into account their expected fu-
ture lifetime utility but, for the same arguments stated above, what will
happen at time (t+ 1) and (t+ 2) does not inuence youngs vote today.
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Youngs di¤erential utility is therefore:
uYt = u
Y
t
 
vYt = 
  uYt  vYt =  (1.20)
By substituting Eq. (1.5), (1.6), (1.7), (1.10) and (1.12) into (1.20), we
get:
uYt (pt+2)= log (1  i)+ log (1 + )+ log (1  )
+pt+2 log (1 + )+pt+2 log (1  ) (1.21)
Young, in case of innovation, again directly benet from the technologic
parameter , but now it impacts both on their labour income when adults
and on their pension benets when retired. In this last case the benet
from innovation is proportional to pt+2, so a longer life gives them more
time to enjoy higher consumption. The cost structure is similar: a con-
stant cost is due to the depreciation of human capital when young become
adults, through a smaller marginal productivity in the production of nal
good. Another cost, proportional to pt+2, takes into account the deprecia-
tion of human capital of youngs children: two periods later, in fact, todays
young will get a pension that will be, in terms of human capital, depreciated
because of todays choice to innovate. Therefore the depreciation term is
mitigated by two terms,  and : the former takes into account the elasticity
between the production of new human capital and the past stock of human
capital, the latter the elasticity of human capital in the production of nal
good.
Consistently with the case of adults, we rewrite Eq. (1.21) in the same
fashion.
Remark 7 Youngs di¤erential utility can be represented by a linear positive
relation linking uY to p, their life expectancy:
uY (p) = mY (; ; ; ; ) p+ qY (; ; ; i; ) (1.22)
wheremY =  log ((1 + ) (1  )) and qY = log ((1  i) ((1 + ) (1  ))).
Lemma 3 Young vote for the adoption of a new technology if and only if
20 Chapter 1
they achieve a life expectancy pt+2 larger than the threshold pY , dened as
pY =
  [log ((1  i) ((1 + ) (1  )))]
 log ((1 + ) (1  )) (1.23)
Conversely, if pt+2 < pY , young are against innovation.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Youngs choices over innovation show similar determinants as adults
ones. Again the threshold level is negatively correlated with the TFP growth
rate () induced by innovation. The depreciation of human capital in the
case of innovation () is a factor that discourages young, as long as adult,
to vote for innovation. For young, increases in both adult and old age
consumption preferences make them to be more prone to innovation.
The e¤ect of the elasticity of past human capital in the production of
human capital () on pY is positive: @p
Y
@ > 0. A high inertia in the transmis-
sion of human capital from one generation to the other leads to less interest
in innovation because, as in Boucekkine et al. (2002). Ceteris paribus,
the more the accumulation of human capital relies on past human capital,
the more it depreciates in case of innovation. Di¤erently from the case of
adults, for young preference for both adult () and old () age consumption
is conducive to innovation.
pO pA pY p
political weight of young people () - 0 0 0
preference for adult age consumption () 0 + - +
preference for old age consumption () 0 - - +
productivity gains from innovation () 0 - - 0
frictional costs of innovation (i) 0 + + -
depreciation of human capital due to innovation () 0 + + -
productivity of human capital in nal good production () 0 + + +
elasticity of past h in the production of new h-capital () 0 0 + +
share of adultsincome used to pay parentspensions (s) 0 + 0 0
constant of proportionality in h-capital production () 0 0 0 +
Table 1:1. Partial e¤ects of parameters on thresholds.
In Table 1:1 we sum up the partial e¤ects of the parameters on the
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thresholds pO, pA and pY . Moreover, we add the e¤ects of the same para-
meters on all the steady state values (p) of the function ht+1 =  1 (ht; it)ht,
derived in the previous section. This will turn out to be useful in the section
where we jointly study the economic and political mechanisms.
1.2.7 Political Outcome
We now dene the static political outcome at each point in time, given
the life expectancies of every age class. We derive some propositions, in
terms of key parameters of the economy, that allow to classify the econ-
omys dynamic features, analyzed in the next subsection. To resume how
the political choice works, in Figure 1:4 we plot the graphs of uA (p)
and uY (p) (Eq. (1.18) and Eq. (1.22) , respectively) and report, on the
p axis, the value of pY , pA, 1 and (an arbitrary) pO.
Fig. 1:4. Di¤erential utilities and thresholds.
At time t the three generations alive are represented by their own life
expectancies: pt for old people born at time (t  2), pt+1 for adults born at
time (t  1) and pt+2 for young people born at time t.17 Life expectancy
of each of the three age class is therefore compared with the corresponding
threshold: pt with pO, pt+1 with pA and pt+2 with pY . From (1.11) we know
17More precisely, the best interpretation of old peoples pt is not in term of life ex-
pectancy, but as their mass in the political choice at time t.
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that for pt < pO adults alone decide upon innovation. If pt > pO, innovation
takes place only if both pt+1 > pA and pt+2 > pY .
Proposition 2 With standard intertemporal discounting behavior, i.e.  =
2, it is never the case of pA < pY < 1. Moreover, in the case of  > 2,it
is possible to nd a parametrization characterized by small values of , large
values of  and intermediate values of i such that pA < pY < 1 is feasible.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The Proposition above states that when the discount factor is indepen-
dent from the time index but it only depends on the distance between
two points in time
 
the case  = 2

, there are not feasible values of life
expectancy such that adults are in favor of innovation while young are
not. That is because young get a double benet from innovation, both
during their adulthood and old age. Discounting them in the same way,
it is intuitive that once they became adult they cannot "do better" than
when they were young, in the sense that they discount old age consump-
tion in the same way as before, but now the gains will only be from one
side (i.e. higher pension contributions by their children) and will be only a
fraction, depending on s, of their childs gain in productivity. The sec-
ond part of the Proposition states that if people attach a large weight on
old age consumption, for some values of life expectancy it can be the case
that, when young, they are not in favor of innovation, while adults are.
This is because the variable part of net gains young get with innovation
(the last two terms in Eq. (1.23)) are only in part linked to life expectancy,
and therefore they are less reactive to large values of . Adultsvariable
part and constant part of net gains are instead directly linked by the para-
meters  and  (see Eq. (1.19)). By allowing  to increase, the di¤erential
expected future lifetime utility of adults increases at an higher rate than
that of young, giving rise to the case of pA < pY < 1.
Corollary 1 Young are in favor of innovation for any given level of life ex-
pectancy if innovation costs are small enough, i.e. i < 1 ((1 + ) (1  ))  
i.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Intuitively, since young get benets in adult age and adulthood is reached
with probability one, for large enough productivity improvement from inno-
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vation () they are favorable to innovation if it is cheap (i < i), no matter
what is their life expectancy. An implication of this Corollary is that the
decision to adopt a new technology is therefore in the hand of adults alone
when frictional costs are small.
Noting that whenever pY < pA the political outcomes in the case of
"workersdictatorship" and "diluted power" are the same,18 we derive the
following key Proposition.
Proposition 3 Whenever  = 2 the decision to adopt a new technology is
made by adults alone: no matter the value of pO, innovation is implemented
i¤ pt+1 > pA.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The previous Proposition, that is only based on utility parameters, rules
out the case of adult deciding alone to innovate against the will of both
young and old. Workersdictatorship does not arise whenever intertemporal
discounting shows usual exponential behavior. However, the case of pA <
pY < 1 is only a necessary condition for an innovative workersdictatorship
to arise: when reaching life expectancy pA adults need to be the absolute
majority, so to implement their preferred policy. We resume this in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 4 Whenever pA < pY < 1 and  < 1  pA an innovative workers
dictatorship arises for adultslife expectancy pt+1 2
 
pA;minfpY ; pOg :
Proof. (See Appendix).
This Lemma states that, although observationally equivalent, innova-
tion episodes arise from very di¤erent sources: it can be a strong majority
of adults alone, coupled with a "light" presence of young, that decides to
implement an innovation or it can be a coalition of young and adults. In
this last case the weight of young in the political decision is not important,
since adults and young together hold always an absolute majority of votes.
We have now a number of Propositions and Lemmas that allow to tax-
onomize and describe the dynamic evolution of the economy. This is done
in the next Subsection.
18 It is clear inspecting Eq. (1.11).
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1.2.8 Dynamics and Discussion
The transitional dynamic of the economy during the adjustment toward
the steady state is the core analysis of this section. The articial economy
we describe is one in which initial life expectancy is small but increasing
and people are not yet in favor of innovation, in order to give an example of
some dynamic behaviors of the economy. We leave to the reader the analysis
of other kinds of dynamics, easily derivable from the economys properties
described up to this point.19 We therefore assume two restrictions to hold
for initial life expectancy p0:20
p0 < minfpO; pA; pY g (1.24)
p
 
hU0

< p0 < p
 
hS0 (it)

(1.25)
where (1.25) means that initial life expectancy p0 lies between the values
that p (h) takes at the two successive unstable and stable steady states of
ht+1 =  1 (ht; it)h

t, respectively. These assumptions ensure that at time
t = 0 life expectancy is monotonically increasing toward its steady state
value pS = p
 
hS0 (it)

. The preferred policy is N because, due to Eq.
(1.19) and (1.23), agents vote against innovation. We further assume that
two more restrictions hold: pA < 1 and pY < 1, so that both adults and
young can, in principle, be in favor of innovation for large enough values
of life expectancy.21 We keep track of the evolution of pt knowing that
it converges monotonically toward its steady value pS . The evolution of
pt allows us to describe the (possible) variations in the innovation policy
adopted. The political outcome, dened by Eq. (1.11), depends on (i) the
relative ordering of fpO; pA; pY g and (ii) the one-to-one comparison between
the triplets fpt; pt+1; pt+2g and fpO; pA; pY g. Moreover, where pS is located
with respect to pO, pA and pY a¤ects the long run policy implemented.
Given assumptions (1.17), (1.24) and (1.25), up to four dynamic scenar-
19As an example, other kinds of dynamics include cases in which initial life expectancy
is decreasing toward a lower steady state or cases in which the initial undertaken policy
is I.
20Without loss of generality, we assume that p0 is the life expectancy of young born at
time t = 0. Note that p0 6= p: the former is the value of life expectancy that the economy
shows at time t = 0, the latter is the value of life expectancy that function p (h) takes for
h = 0.
21The inequalities pA < 1 and pY < 1 resolve in 1 s
1 s i < ((1 + ) (1  ))

 and
1
1 i < (1 + )
+ (1  )(+), respectively.
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ios are possible.
Proposition 4 The evolution over time of an economy characterized by an
increasing life expectancy, whose initial value is p0 < minfpO; pA; pY ; pSg
and  is small, shows up to four di¤erent dynamics in term of innovation
policy. Which of the four dynamics the economy experiences depends on the
four thresholdsordering. The ordering of the thresholds depends, in turns,
on the underlying parameters. The four possible dynamics are the following:
1. The economy never engages in innovation whenever (1:a)  = 2, the
share of income going to pension system s is large and the productivity
parameter  is small or (1:b) =2 is su¢ ciently larger than 1 and
human capital production is not very e¤ective (small ; " and/or )
or (1:c) =2 is su¢ ciently larger than 1, youngs political weight  is
large and human capital production is not too e¤ective.
2. Whenever (2:a)  = 2 and the scale parameter  is large or (2:b)
=2 is substantially larger than 1 and  takes small absolute values,
the economy at some point switches to a regime of steady innovation
adoption, ending up in a steady state in which output grows over time
at a rate .
3. The economy experiences innovation for a limited time span. Before
and after this limited period of enhanced output growth the economy
evolves without innovating, ending up in a steady state in which output
is constant over time. This is the case for =2 larger than 1, small
absolute values of  and relatively small youngs political weight .
4. The economy experiences two waves of innovation, the second of which
lasts forever. The economy behaves as in the previous point (3), but be-
fore reaching the human capital steady state hS0
 
and, therefore, p = pS

it again incurs in preference for innovation. Its outputs steady state
growth rate is . This dynamic behavior is achieved for values of 
larger than in the previous case.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The four scenarios depicted in the previous proposition describe the four
di¤erent regimes that an economy characterized by endogenous increase in
life expectancy and centralized decisions upon innovation policy can show.
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Note that regimes 3 and 4 and, in general, ordering of fpO; pA; pY ; pSg in
which pA < pY are not feasible in the case the intertemporal discounting
behavior of agents is characterized by  = 2.
1.3 Conclusions
Over the past century, all OECD countries have been characterized by a
dramatic increase in economic conditions, life expectancy and education
attainments. This paper examines the unexplored interactions among ag-
ing, human capital formation, technology adoption and economic growth.
Assuming that longevity is positively correlated with the level of human
capital, it demonstrates that an increase of life expectancy is, in principle, a
growth-enhancing factor. However, its e¤ectiveness can be harmed by two
phenomena, one related to human capital accumulation and the other to
aggregation issues about technology adoption.
We reach Blackburn and Ciprianis (2002) same conclusions about the
pure economic e¤ects of an increase in longevity. Due to the positive causal
e¤ect of human capital on expected life expectancy, it can be the case that
small levels of human capital lead to a short life, and this in turn disincen-
tives people to invest in education, giving rise to a poverty trap. At this
stage of development, life expectancy is short and human capital stock is
small.
About the political features of our economy, we nd that a variation
in life expectancy a¤ects both the individual incentives to innovate and
the aggregate choices of the economy, since political representativeness of
di¤erent age classes changes. At individual level a higher life expectancy
increases the incentive to innovate for both young and adults. However, at
the aggregate level di¤erent congurations can arise due to the endogenous
changes in the demographic structure. Relatively to the predictions about
the transition toward the steady state, we nd that during the rst stages
of development, when (i) human capital is negligible, (ii) life expectancy
is short and (iii) retired people are few, the political power is in the hand
of adult workers alone. The decision to innovate or not coincides, there-
fore, with adultschoice. In the case their incentives to innovate are small
(i.e. a large share of labour income going to nance the pension system, a
large elasticity of the human capital used in production or a high concern
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in adult age consumption) they impose to the whole economy a no inno-
vation regime. In developed economies, where (i) life expectancy is long,
(ii) human capital endowment is large and (iii) retired people are several, a
political majority that enforces an innovation policy can be achieved only
by means of a coalition. Since elderly people are innovation averse, the only
way for an innovation to be implemented is that both young and adult are in
favour of innovation. Therefore, if on the one hand a longer life expectancy
pushes peoples incentives toward innovation, on the other hand it makes the
political weight of old to increase, making the achievement of a consensus
for innovation potentially more di¢ cult. This is true, in particular, when
youngs incentives for innovation are lower than the ones of adult, in the case
of a high inertia in the transmission of human capital from one generation
to the next one and when the preference for old age consumption is large.
However, if intertemporal discounting is standard, the case of adults in favor
of innovation and, at the same time, young against is not feasible. With this
paper we provide the basis for joining together two strands of the literature
on economic growth that are gaining importance in the research and political
debate: technologic innovation and aging population. We stress how di¤er-
ent links run between these two phenomena, dening the possible conict
of interests among di¤erent generations and showing how the lengthening of
life expectancy changes the way this conict of interests is solved. Moreover,
we stress how private and public choices combine (or not) in order to give
birth to a human capital abundant, growing economy.
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1.4 Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition (1). For simplicity, we drop the time index and
substitute H with h. Let p (h) =
pL+pH

h
hF

( 1+1 )
1+

h
hF

( 1+1 )
, with  > 1 and
0 < hF < 1 . Straightforward calculations lead to p0 (h)  0, p00 (h) R 0
for h Q hF , and p0
 
hF

=
(pH pL)
4hF

2 1


. hF is therefore the value of
h such that p (h) shows an inection point. Note that p0 (h) jh=hF > 0 and
@p0(h)j
h=hF
@ > 0. From (1.10) we build the function
~  (p (h) ;h) =   (ht; it)h

t,
where we (i) separate the dependency from human capital and life ex-
pectancy and (ii) drop the innovation variable it. Playing with  we obtain
that for h = hF the limiting functions ~ 
 
pL;h

and ~ 
 
pH ;h

take values
below and above hF , respectively i.e. ~ 
 
pL;hF

< hF and ~ 
 
pH ;hF

>
hF . Since lim!+1 p0
 
hF
 ! +1, the function ~  (p (h) ;h) takes values
~ 
 
p
 
hF  4h ;  hF  4h < hF and ~   p  hF +4h ;  hF +4h > hF
for any 4h = o (h) > 0 and 1 < M (4h) <  < +1, where M (4h) is a
threshold related to the (arbitrary small) magnitude of 4h. For continuity
of ~  (p (h) ;h) there is a steady state at hF where function ~  (p (h) ;h) crosses
the 45 degrees line from below. This steady state is therefore unstable. Cal-
culus inspection shows that
@(~ (p(h);h))
@h > 0 in [0;1), limh!0+
@(~ (p(h);h))
@h !
+1 and limh!+1 @(
~ (p(h);h))
@h ! 0+. With ~  (p (0) ; 0) = 0 we can prove that
the function ~  (p (h) ;h) shows four steady states, alternatively unstable and
stable. These are hU0 = 0, 0 < hS1 < hF , hU1 = hF and hF < hS2 < +1.
Proof of Lemma (1). Adults get the absolute majority if and only if their
share is bigger than 12 : imposing
1
+1+pt
> 12 we obtain, solving for pt,
pt < 1 . For similar considerations it is possible to show that both +1+pt
and pt+1+pt can not exceed
1
2 .
Proof of Lemma (2). The expression of pA is obtained from (1.16) solving
uAt (pt+1) = 0 for pt+1. Given (1.17) and i > 0, the graph of u
A
t (pt+1)
has a negative intercept and crosses the uAt = 0 axis from below, proving
the Lemma.
Proof of Lemma (3). The expression of pY is obtained from (1.21) solving
uYt (pt+2) = 0 for pt+2.
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Proof of Proposition (2). The strategy we follow to prove the rst part
of the Proposition is to break the two inequalities and to show that both
can not simultaneously hold for any parametrization of the model. Let us
dene
	()1 = 
2
 
1  pY 
= 2 + 
log ((1 + ) (1  ))
log ((1 + ) (1  )) +
log (1  i)
log ((1 + ) (1  ))
and
	()2 = 
2
 
pA   pY 
= 
0@ log ((1 + ) (1  ))
log ((1 + ) (1  )) +
log

1 s
1 s i

log ((1 + ) (1  ))
1A
+
log (1  i)
log ((1 + ) (1  ))
using (1.19), (1.23) and substituting  = 2. We only write the dependency
of both 	1 and 	2 on  for brevity. It turns out that the two inequalities
pA < pY and pY < 1 are both satised if both 	2 < 0 and 	1 > 0 hold,
respectively. In Figure 1:5 we show the shapes of these two functions in
terms of .
α
α2 α1
αc
Ψ1
Ψn(0)
Ψ2
Ψn(αc)
Figure. 1:5. Shapes of 	1 and 	2, their intersections with the axis and their crossing points.
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The rst order derivatives of	1 and	2 with respect to  are	01 =
log((1+)(1 ))
log((1+)(1 ))+
2 and 	02 =
log((1+)(1 ))
log((1+)(1 )) +
log( 1 s1 s i)
log((1+)(1 )) . The second derivatives are
	001 = 2 and 	002 = 0, implying that 	1 is a quadratic function of  and
for  > 0 it is increasing at an increasing rate. 	1 is a positively sloped
straight line. For  = 0; both 	1 and 	2 take the same value 	(0)1 =
	(0)2 = 	(0)n =  
log( 11 i)
log((1+)(1 )) < 0, as shown in the graph. Moreover,
	2 is steeper than 	1, for any values of the parameters and for some small
values of 

from an inspection of 	01 and 	02; until
log( 1 s1 s i)
log((1+)(1 )) > 2

.
Therefore for  : 0   < 2, 	2 < 0 holds, while it is not the case for
	1 > 0. Because of their shapes and their crossing in  = 0, they also
have to cross again for some positive value of . If the crossing point
(	 (c)n) of 	1 and 	2 lies below the -axis and c < 1, this means
that there are values of : 1 <  < 2 such that both 	2 < 0 and
	1 > 0 hold at the same time. This cannot be the case because equat-
ing 	1 to 	2 gives c =
log( 1 s1 s i)
log((1+)(1 )) , that plugged into 	1 or 	2 gives
	(c)1 = 	(c)2 = 	(c)n =
log( 1 s1 s i)
2
(log((1+)(1 )))2 +
log( 1 s i+is1 s i )
log((1+)(1 )) > 0,
for any values of ; s; i; ;  and  in their supports. The rst part of the
Proposition is therefore proved. The second part relies again on split-
ting the inequality pA < pY < 1 in two. pA < pY can be rewritten as
mY
mA
<   log(1 i)+ log((1+)(1 ))
 log( 1 s1 s i)
that is satised for  ! 0 since the left
hand side is constant and independent from  while the right hand side
goes to +1. This result does not depend on the value of  while it depends
on the value of i: although for  ! 0 the inequality holds, for a range
of  such that i < 1   ((1 + ) (1  )) , the right hand side numera-
tor is negative. That is why for some positive values of  the investment
cost can not be too small. pY < 1, on the other hand, can be written
as (1  i) 1 < (1 + )+ (1  )(+). With  and  approaching their
lower and upper bounds (0 and 1,respectively) the inequality holds for small
values of i and it also holds for some right interval of  that is compatible
with the previous inequality pA < pY . This proves the second part of the
Proposition.
Proof of Corollary (1). We need that pY < 0 for some small values
of i. Under assumption (1.17), it is enough to show that qY > 0, by
graphical considerations based on Figure 1:4. This is true if and only if
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(1  i) ((1 + ) (1  )) > 1: By simple algebra the Corollary is proved.
Proof of Proposition (3).  = 2 ensures that pY < pA. For small
i, say i < 1   ((1 + ) (1  )) , young are in favor of innovation 8p 
0. This leads to a share of voters (young) in favor of innovation that is

+1+pt
for pt+1 < pA and a share of voters (young + adults) in favor of
innovation +1+1+pt+1 for pt+1 > p
A. Since pO = 1    it is straightforward
to show that +1+pt <
1
28 2 (0; 1] and +1+1+pt > 128 2 (0; 1]. In the
case of i > 1  ((1 + ) (1  ))  for the positive values of life expectancy
0 < pt+2 < p
Y nobody is in favor of innovation, while for pY < pt+2 and
pt+1 < p
A only young are in favor. Being them a minority the political
outcome is unchanged with respect to the case of nobody backing innovation.
Once pt+1 > pA is achieved, the previous analysis applies.
Proof of Lemma (4). When pt+1 < pA < pY < 1 there is no way for
the economy to support innovation, while with pt+1 > pA (at least) adults
vote for innovation. If youngs vote is not so "heavy" in the political arena, 
i.e.  < 1  pA this implies, using the denition pO = 1  , that pO is
larger than pA. In a right interval of pA innovation takes place because
adults alone want it: their voting share is 1+1+pt+1 and it is larger than
1=2 until pt+1 < pO In case pA < pY < pO innovation takes again place
with pt+1 > pA but in the interval fpY ; pOg it would have taken place even
if adults had not an absolute majority. above pY also young contribute in
backing innovation.
Proof of Proposition (4). As the Proposition, this Proof is divided in
four points. The assumption of small  ensures that, whenever the economy
switches between no innovation to innovation (or vice versa) the ordering of
pO; pA; pY and pS does not change.
1. In case (1:a)  = 2 ensures, from Proposition (3), that pY < pA.
Su¢ ciently large values of s make pA to be larger than pS . In turns,
small values of  lower the steady state level of human capital, and
therefore pS . Independently from , the orderings pY < pS < pA and
pS < pY < pA are consistent with a no innovation policy outcome for
any values of p < pS . In case (1:b) =2 substantially larger then 1
leads to pA < pY : in this case the inequality pS < pA, ensured by
small ; " and/or , is a su¢ cient condition for the case of constant no
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innovation to be in place. In case (1:c) the strong political power of
young impedes adults to decide for innovation alone, since pO < pA <
pY . The limited e¤ectiveness of human capital production ensures
pS < pY .
2. As in case (1:a), in (2:a)  = 2 ensures that pY < pA. At the
same time, large values of  ensures that pA < pS holds. For values
of life expectancy above pA output is increasing at at rate  because
both adults and young vote for innovation. Again, as in case (1:b),
=2 substantially larger then 1 leads to pA < pY also in case (2:b).
Moreover, small values of  implies a small pA, so that for value of life
expectancy larger than pA innovation is always chosen.
3. This case takes place if and only if pA < pO < pS < pY holds. This
conguration requires =2 larger then 1 as a necessary condition so
to have pA < pY . Moreover youngs weight  must be small in order to
have pO < pS . Small absolute values of  make the inequality pA < pO
to be satised.
4. This case takes place if and only if pA < pO < pY < pS holds. Con-
ditions on the parameters are the same as in case (3) but  must be
slightly larger in order to have young in favor of innovation for values
of life expectancy in the interval (pY ; pS).
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Chapter 2
A Dynamic
Politico-Economic Model of
Intergenerational Contracts
Why should I care about future generations? What have they done for me?"
(Groucho Marx)
2.1 Introduction
The implementation of intergenerational redistribution programs is a crucial
issue in the current political debate. On the one hand, the public system can
be manipulated for political purposes; on the other hand, it is not clear how
a transfer scheme should be designed to be optimal and, thus, less responsive
to political pressure. For these reasons, it becomes critical to explore the
conditions under which intergenerational transfers, as outcome of a political
voting game, can be implemented and why the welfare system developed so
far has become a stable institution of modern society.
Since intergenerational redistribution is carried out by means of demo-
cratic voting, an important source of heterogeneity across individuals con-
cerns their di¤erence in age. Heterogeneous agents account for a big compo-
nent of the variability in asset holdings as well as in sources of income. As
a consequence, the conict between di¤erent age-classes is likely to arise on
a broader set of scal instruments than the size of social-security transfers.
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Given the special focus of our analyses on the age-class heterogeneity
and the inter-classes political conicts, among all the redistributive pro-
grams, we point out the relevant role played by two critical age-target poli-
cies: public higher education spending and PAYG social security. These
intergenerational redistributive programs, strongly interrelated with each
other, have deep redistributive impact and have recently experienced even
stronger political support in modern democracies. Following the terminology
adopted by Rangel (2003), we refer to public higher education spending as
forward (i.e. productive) intergenerational transfers and to unfunded pen-
sion as backward (i.e. pork barrel and log-rolling) intergenerational trans-
fers. The former are transfers going forward in time generating a cost for
the present generation and a benet for the future one, being crucial for
future productive capacity through human capital production. By contrast,
the latter are transfers going backward generating a cost for the present gen-
eration and a benet for the past one, giving adults a claim on the future
productivity of their young.1 This di¤erent timing of exchange generates
di¤erent incentive problems.
Furthermore, the aging of population plays a relevant role in stressing
even more the timing of the intergenerational bargaining from both a de-
mographic and a political point of view. On the one hand, the quantitative
component of population aging, i.e. the mass e¤ects due to population
growth dynamics (demographic aging), has a direct economic impact on the
nancial solvency of the public system, since the fraction of recipients the
retirees tends to increase, while the share of contributors the workers -
tends to decreases. On the other hand, the qualitative component of pop-
ulation aging, i.e. the political ideology inuence of the old age-class in
the electoral competition process (political aging), has an indirect economic
impact through the electoral vote. As population ages, so do the voters.
In democratic society population aging leads to an increase in the political
representation of the elderly, who gather a larger share of votes.2 As politi-
1The welfare of a generation depends on the action taken by past generations and,
in turn, a¤ects the well-being of the future one. For example, the development of each
generation of youth depends on the resources for education and sustenance that it receives
from workers through taxation system. At the same time the well-being of the elderly
depends on social programs that provide income support.
2The political inuence of the old is magnied by their homogenous preferences in
terms of economic policies. According to Mulligan and Xala-i-Martin (1999) old agents
are "single-minded".
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cians seek re-election, they will try to address the needs of the crucial voting
group the old with generous social security policies.
Empirical motivation relies on recognizing that since the Second World
War developed countries have experienced dynamically e¢ cient growth path,
i.e. the economic growth rate has fallen below the interest rate, and have
been characterized by underaccumulation on physical capital (Abel et al.,
1989). Under such an economic scenario, exacerbated by the recent demo-
graphic transition, there would be no elements in the previous literature to
justify the implementation of PAYG social security programs,3 which would
depress savings further and, consequently, intertemporal consumption and,
in turn, economic growth. Furthermore, even in the case of a dynamic
ine¢ ciency scenario, a PAYG social security scheme is a dynamically incon-
sistent agreement between successive generations. Adult generations would
be better o¤ discontinuing the PAYG scheme and setting up a new one.
However, quite surprisingly, the share of per-capita GDP used to nance
social security following retributive schemes remains substantial.4 For these
reasons, the existence of unfunded pension schemes seems puzzling. Hence
the question arises of why PAYG schemes survive.
Departing from previous literature, we support the existence of a pension
system also in an economy experiencing a dynamically e¢ cient path and
characterized by underaccumulation on physical capital, conditionally on the
existence of public investment in human capital in a time consistent scenario.
The following idea is defended: selsh adults buy insurance for their future
old age both by paying productive education transfers for their children and
by taking care of their parents. Obviously the contract works only if the
cost of providing a productive transfer is low with respect to the value of
receiving a pork-barrel transfer when old. Therefore, if a PAYG pension
scheme is introduced,5 its future beneciaries may become supportive of
3There are many explanations in the literature on why pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social
security has been introduced and then expanded. The classical solution on the puzzle is
that, if the economy is on dynamically ine¢ cient path i.e. the interest rate falls below the
economic growth rate, then the introduction of a PAYG social security system is Pareto
improving since it reduces the capital deepening. Among others, see Azariadis and Galasso
(2002).
4OECD data show how public tertiary education and social security transfers become
increasingly important and strategic among the main components of public expenditure
in modern welfare countries. Focusing on European Union members, in 2007 public ex-
penditures on higher education took on average of 1:46 percent of GDP (OECD, 2008)
and pension transfers were on average 7:8 percent of GDP (OECD, 2008).
5PAYG pension schemes in which pensions are nanced by contributions from current
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higher funding to public education via taxes. In other words, the existence
of a retributive social security system gives incentives to invest optimally in
human capital and, as a consequence, it becomes growth enhancing for the
economic system. Thus, the two age-specic redistributive programs may
self-sustain under a dynamic e¢ ciency scenario and under certain economic
and institutional conditions reach Pareto optimality.
Technically, this paper highlights two main features concerning scal
policies. First, several political choices have to be set at the same time,
so the political space cannot be reduced to a mere unidimensional problem.
Second, since political decisions and private intertemporal choices are mutu-
ally a¤ected over time, then selsh perfect forward-looking agents internalize
how political current choices will inuence the evolution of the economy and
the implementation of future policies.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a tractable dynamic politico-
economic theory to analyze how intergenerational conicts a¤ect, through
the political mechanisms in the form of democratic vote, the size and com-
position of public expenditures in a context of population aging. Focusing
on target-specic transfers, our main objective concerns the determination
of the economic and institutional conditions which may induce the emer-
gence of a decentralized implicit intergenerational contract based on side
payments in the form of PAYG and public education transfers. The econ-
omy we study is characterized by overlapping generations living three peri-
ods: youth, adulthood and old age. Besides their private consumption, both
the adults and the elderly value the public transfers; the presence of a politi-
cal system is justied by the need to nance the provision of public spending.
In our environment there are two types of selsh agents: the private players
choose the optimal saving and vote their political representatives and the
elected "public player" decides on public policies. The electoral competi-
workers have often been criticized as detrimental to growth. According to Feldstein (1974)
such pension schemes have a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation since they discourage
private saving and, unlike in the case of a funded pension system, the payments into the
PAYG scheme do not contribute to the national saving. Moreover, the implicit rate of
return on contributions to a PAYG scheme typically falls short of the interest rate. There-
fore according to such analysis, PAYG pension systems reduce per capita income. This
standard argument is focused on physical capital accumulation and fails to take notice of
the e¤ect of PAYG pension systems have on the accumulation of human capital, particu-
larly through public education. Primary and secondary education is now overwhelmingly
publicly nanced in all OECD countries, and universities also receive substantial funding
from public sources.
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tion takes place in a majoritarian probabilistic environment, where political
representatives compete proposing multidimensional scal platforms, con-
cerning both the income tax level and the provision of intergenerational
transfers in the benet formula, subject to intra-period budget balance. We
assume away the provision of public goods - a key element in the political
economy of scal policy6 - in order to bring out more clearly the impact of
political institutions on intergenerational transfers.
The focal point of this paper is the characterization of time-consistent
public policies in a multidimensional dynamic political setting. Following
Maskin and Tirole (2001), we embody the "minor causes should have minor
e¤ect" principle to implement di¤erentiable Stationary Markov Subgame
Perfect Equilibria (SMPE ), where the size of the income tax rate and the
amount of intergenerational transfers are conditioned on the two payo¤-
relevant asset variables: physical and human capital. We determine the
political policy rules as equilibrium outcomes in a nite horizon environment
when time goes to innity. As a result we are able to overcome the main
limit related to trigger strategies equilibria, which are not robust to such
renement.7
Ruling out commitment devices and reputation mechanisms, solving
backward and making the time horizon go to innity, we determine time-
consistent policy rule reaching the following results: 1) the dynamic e¢ -
ciency condition is necessary for the simultaneous existence of public educa-
tion and PAYG programs; 2) the equilibrium political decisions are no ed-
ucation strategic, while due to distortionary taxation and to the politicians
opportunistic behavior, strategic persistency underlies the determination of
the income tax rate; 3) three di¤erent welfare state regimes arise depending
on institutional variables, i.e. the adultsand the elderlys relative bargain-
ing power, and on economic variables, i.e. the endogenous level of physical
capital; 4) demographic aging increases the equilibrium per-capita level in
public education spending and depending on the welfare state regime has
an ambiguous e¤ect on the size of government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2:2 reviews the literature.
6This issue is yet well investigated by Tabellini (1991) ; Lizzeri and Persico (2001),
Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2005).
7As natural benchmark in Chapter 3 we will compare the political equilibrium outcome
with the time-consistent Central Planner solution in an innite horizon environment in
order to point out normative predictions.
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In section 2:3 we present the model characterizing the economic environ-
ment and solving the individual economic problem. Section 2:4 presents the
politico-economic equilibrium in the cases of both a myopic scenario and
a perfect forward-looking one. We provide a complete characterization of
both the transition dynamics and the long run of the economy. Section 2:5
concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter relies on the dynamic political economy literature that incor-
porates forward-looking decision makers in a multidimensional policy space
without commitment. In particular our paper relates to two main streams
of literature.
On the one hand, it supports and gives new theoretic foundations to
the existing literature on social security sustainability, which recognizes the
link between productive and redistributive public spending. From a pure
economic point of view Boldrin and Montes (2005) formalize public educa-
tion and PAYG systems as two parts of an intergenerational contract where
public pensions are the return of the investment into the human capital
of the next generation. The authors show how an interconnected pension
and public education system can replicate the allocation achieved by com-
plete markets. Allowing issue-by-issue voting, Rangel (2003) studies in a
three-period OLG model the ability of non-market institutions to optimally
invest in "forward intergenerational goods" and "backward intergenerational
goods". Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) incorporate politics in an OLG
model to analyze how societies might sustain public investments (e.g. edu-
cation) even if the interests of those benetting from the investment are not
represented in the political process. Restricting voting to a binary choice
of the tax rate and education, the authors study whether a given system
can be maintained but do not determine the level of investment in educa-
tion or social security. As a main shortcoming the previous studies have
assumed voters played trigger strategies. Although trigger strategies may
be analytical convenient, they lead to multiplicity of equilibria. Further-
more, they require coordination among agents and costly enforcement of a
punishment technology which may not work when agents are not patient
enough. Finally, they are not robust to renements such as backward in-
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duction in a nite horizon economy when time tends to innity. As a main
consequence time inconsistent equilibria may be attained in an environment
characterized by no credible punishment devices, therefore the second best
cannot be achieved (see Klein et al., 2008). Unlike the previous literature,
rather than emphasizing complementarity between education and pension
payments purely, which are purely sustained because of reputation mecha-
nisms, our model adopts a di¤erent perspective. It focuses on the resolution
of the intergenerational conict over the determination of the amount of the
two public spending components in a Markovian environment.
On the other hand, this paper also contributes to the growing literature
on dynamic politico-economic models. Starting from the seminal work of
Krusell et al. (1997), the most interesting issue in the dynamic political
economy literature concerns the modelling of economies where endogenous
dynamic feedbacks between private and political choices are explicitly con-
sidered. Due to theoretical complexities, to extend standard static models
to understand fully dynamic policy-making has proved to be di¢ cult, even
in the case of one-dimensional policy environments. Krusell and Ríos-Rull
(1999) embed a distortionary income tax system into the neoclassical growth
model in a repeated voting setting and adopt a median voter framework.
They solve the model numerically making predictions on the long run size
of government. In a simpler underlying economic environment Hassler et
al. (2003) develop an OLG model of the welfare state where tax revenues
are used to nance public goods and in each period the level of benets is
determined by majority voting. Studying a linear-quadratic economy, they
provide analytical solutions in one-dimensional policy space but the vot-
ing strategies equilibrium turns out to be either constant or independent
of fundamentals. Hassler et al. (2005) extend this approach to a richer
economic environment in which the welfare state provides an insurance sys-
tem.8 Departing from the past literature we nd analytical solutions in
a multi-dimensional political space where equilibrium voting strategies be-
come non trivially dependent on fundamental asset variables in the political
environment.
8More recent studies extend the dynamic politico-economic modelling to the innite-
horizon Central Planner environment as in Klein et al. (2008), Azzimonti et al. (2009)
and Martin (2009).
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2.3 The Model
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy is populated by an innite
number of overlapping generations of homogenous agents, living up to three-
periods: youth, adulthood and old age. Every agent born at time t survives
with probability one until old age. Population grows at a constant rate
n 2 ( 1; 1) ; thus the mass of a generation born at time j and living at
time t is equal to N jt = N0 (1 + n)
t. When young, an agent spends all
his/her time endowment in acquiring skills without having access to private
credit markets. When adult, the individual works and contributes to the
public spending through taxes, while when old, the individual retires. In
every period, the economy produces a single homogeneous good combining
human capital with physical capital.
At the beginning of each period public policy choices are taken through
a repeated voting system according to a majoritarian rule where ideological
bias is taken into account in the candidateselectoral competition.9 Both
adults and old have voting power.10 In order to cover both e¢ ciency and eq-
uity aspects concerning intergenerational conicts, each candidate proposes
a multidimensional platform where both the size of government and inter-
generational income redistribution are simultaneously considered. The set
of political variables, ft, includes education (i.e. forward looking) transfers,
et, social security (i.e. backward looking) transfers, pt; and a proportional
labor income tax rate, t. The public nancial system is assumed to be
balanced in every period.
The sequential politico-economic game in the repeated voting setting
can be viewed as a Stackelberg game and it is solved by backward in-
duction to guarantee time-consistent solutions. First, the agents deter-
mine the optimal level of savings given the scal stance (Economic Equi-
librium). Second, short-lived o¢ ce-seeking politicians determine both the
optimal level of taxation and the optimal amount of backward and for-
9Given the Markov structure and the evolution of the asset variables, allowing for each
year election instead of each generation one would not change the political outcome of the
model.
10We replicate the stylized facts that young people show a much lower turnout rate at
elections with respect to adults and old. As Galasso and Profeta (2004) report in some
countries elderly people have a higher rate at elections than the young. In the U.S. turnout
rates among those aged 60-69 years in twice as high as among the young (19  29 years).
Again in France it is almost 50% higher.
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ward transfers in order to maximize the probability of winning the elections
(Politico-Economic Equilibrium). We allow for fully rational and forward-
looking voters, restricting the notion of politico-economic equilibrium to the
di¤erentiable political SMPE concept as equilibrium renement of subgame
perfect equilibria.11
2.3.1 Production
At each time t a homogenous private good, Yt, is produced using a linear
technology both in labor, Lt; and capital, Kt; which fully depreciates. The
linearity of the production function can be derived as an equilibrium out-
come in a context of perfect international capital mobility and factor price
equalization in the presence of goods trade. The production function at time
t is:
Yt = wtLt +RKt (2.1)
where the wage rate, wt = ! (1 + ht), and the gross rental price to capital,
R, are determined by the marginal productivity condition for factor price
(@Yt=@Lt = wt and @Yt=@Kt = R).12 At any time t; each adult supplies in-
elastically one unit of labor,13 Lt = N t 1t , with productivity equal to !
augmented by the level of human capital acquired the period before, ht.
Without loss of generality we normalize ! = 1:
The human capital per worker, ht, is an increasing function in both
parental human capital and public higher education spending.14 The public
education transfer is supplied in an egalitarian way, consequently, to each
11The Markov-perfect concept implies that outcomes are history-dependent only in the
fundamental state variables. The stationary part is introduced to focus only on the current
value of the payo¤ relevant state variable. Consequently the vector of equilibrium policy
decision rules is not indexed by time, i.e. the structural relation among payo¤-relevant
state variables and political controls is not time variant. The di¤erentiable part is a
convenient requirement to avoid multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes and in order to give
clear positive political predictions.
12Given the absence of capital income tax, in our economy the gross rental price to
physical capital and the net one coincide, R = r +  where  = 1 for the assumption of
full depreciation of Kt.
13Since adults supply labor inelastically, income taxation does not distort individual
labor supply decision at the margin.
14The importance and the empirical relevance of both the public spending in schooling
inputs and the parental education input in the formation of the human capital of the
young people has been explored theoretically as well as empirically. For a comprehensive
survey of the related literature see Becker and Tomes (1986).
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individual is given the same level of it. Thus, the acquisition of skills requires
the public transfers and a stock of existing human capital. In aggregate
terms the following Cobb-Douglas human capital technology is adopted:
Ht+1 =
 
Ht + (1  ) H

E1 t (2.2)
where Ht = htN t 1t , H = hN
t 1
t and Et = etN
t
t : After simple algebra we
obtain the following per-capita human capital technology:
ht+1 = H [et; ht] 

ht + (1  ) h
1 + n

e1 t (2.3)
where  2 (0; 1) : h is the constant society endowment of human capital and
ht is the dynastys human capital at time t.
Physical capital fully depreciates each period. Consequently, the level of
savings, st, determines the dynamics of per-capita physical capital accumu-
lation. The capital market clears when:
(1 + n) kt+1 = st (2.4)
2.3.2 Households
Agents born at time t   1 evaluate consumption according to the follow-
ing intertemporal, non altruistic, expected utility function dened over the
vector ct  (c1;t; c2;t+1) 2 R2++:
Ut 1 [ct] = u [c1;t] + u [c2;t+1] (2.5)
where  2 (0; 1) is the time discount factor. c1;t represents the consumption
at time t when adult and c2;t+1 is the consumption at time t+ 1 when old.
In the rst period of life (youth), the individual does not consume. The
function u [] is concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable and satises the
Inada condition, i.e. lim
ct!0
uc [ct] = 1. Assume that preferences exhibit the
logarithmic form, i.e. u [] = log [].
The individual budget constraints of the agents are as follows:
c1;t  C1;t [t; ht; kt+1] (2.6)
where C1;t [t; ht; kt+1]  (1 + ht) (1  t) (1 + n) kt+1:When adult, agents
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consume their labor income net of the proportional labor tax and individual
savings.
c2;t+1  C2;t+1 [pt+1; kt+1] (2.7)
where C2;t+1 [pt+1; kt+1]  R (1 + n) kt+1+ pt+1: When old, agents consume
their total income, equal to the sum of pension benets that their children
pass to them in a PAYG fashion, and the capitalized savings at a xed gross
rental price R.
The net present value at time t of the lifetime wealth of an agent born
at time t  1 is then:
It = (1 + ht) (1  t) + pt+1
R
(2.8)
2.3.3 Individual Optimal Decisions
Adults choose their optimal savings taking as given scal and redistributive
policies.15 Maximizing Eq. (2.5) subject to the individual budget constraints
(2.6) and (2.7) ; the following rst order condition for interior solutions must
hold in equilibrium:
0 =  [t; pt+1; ht; kt+1]  uc1;t [C1;t [t; ht; kt+1]] Ruc2;t+1 [C2;t+1 [pt+1; kt+1]]
(2.9)
Then, in equilibrium by the implicit function theorem there exists a
unique saving function, kt+1, which satises the condition (2.9). We can
rewrite the optimal level of savings in terms of lifecycle after-tax endowment
as:
kt+1 = K [(1 + ht) (1  t) ; pt+1] (2.10)
Given any separable additive intertemporal utility, Eq. (2.10) emphasizes
the income and substitution e¤ects due to a variation of the implemented
policies on the individual saving choice.16
Denition 2 Given the sequence of taxes and intergenerational transfers,
15From now on, we adopt the following notation. Let z [x; q [x]] be a function in the
variable x; zx  @z[x]@x is the partial derivative and dzdx is the total derivative.
16Under logarithmic utility function the equilibrium saving is as follows:
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ft = ft; et; ptg1t=0, and the initial conditions (h0; k0) ; an Economic Equilib-
rium is dened as a set of functions fct; ht+1; kt+1g1t=0 such that individual
choices are consistent with the law of motion of the economy described in
Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.10). Markets clear at any point in time.
At time t the indirect utility, W1;t [] ; of an adult born a time t   1, is
then equal to:
W1;t [t; pt+1; ht; kt+1]  max
kt+1
fUt 1 j Itg (2.11)
where W1;t [] = u [C1;t [t; ht; kt+1]] + u [C2;t+1 [pt+1; kt+1]].
For an old individual born a time t   2 the indirect utility, W2;t [] ; at
time t is as follows:
W2;t [pt; kt]  u [C2;t [pt; kt]] (2.12)
We dene as laissez-faire indirect utility, WLF1;t , the lifetime utility of
an adult born at time t   1; when no public taxation and spending are
considered:
WLF1;t [kt+1]  max
kt+1
fUt 1 j It = 1g (2.13)
Suppose there is no government that has the authority to levy taxes. As
a consequence, adults keep the entirety of their labor income to purchase
the nal good and to save. Capital earns a gross return of R, used by the old
to buy the consumption good. Clearly, the economy converges to the unique
steady state in at most one period, where hLF = 0; kLF = (1+)(1+n) ; c
LF
1 =
1
1+ ; c
LF
2 =

1+R and w
LF = 1:
2.3.4 Government balanced budget constraints
The governments budget is balanced in every period. This implies that in
each period the total benets paid to old and young equalize total contri-
butions collected from working generations:
(1 + n) kt+1 =

(1 + )
wt (1  t)  1 + n
R (1 + )
(wt+1t+1   (1 + n) et+1)
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(1 + ht) t = (1 + n)et +
pt
1 + n
(2.14)
Ceteris paribus, the more the population ages, the higher the aggregate
pension benets for old agents are and the lower the aggregate education
transfers for young people are. The condition above allows us to reduce the
multidimensionality of the political platform to ft 2 R2 where ft  (et; t).
Let e^t and p^t be the maximum feasible values of education and pension
transfers at each time t:
Denition 3 A feasible allocation is a sequence of education transfers, pen-
sions, labor income tax rates and saving decisions fet; pt; t; kt+1g1t=0 that
satises the implementability constraint, (2.10), the balanced budget con-
straints, (2.14), et 2 (0; e^t) ; pt 2 (0; p^t) and t 2 (0; 1) 8t.
2.4 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In this section we consider a government of politically-motivated but short-
lived representatives that have the authority to levy labor income taxes and
to transfer income across generations.17 Public policies are chosen through
a repeated voting system without commitment where elections take place at
the beginning of each period. Young have no political power. To character-
ize the behavior of politicians we consider a probabilistic voting setting.18
In this environment there are two policy-maker candidates who compete
in a majoritarian election proposing their own political multidimensional
17We assume that once the scal plan is implemented no one can default on it.
18Due to the multidimensionality of the political platform ft; et; ptg Condorcet winner
generally fails to exist. Consequently the median voter theorem doesnt hold (Plot, 1967).
In the literature there are three main inuential approaches for making predictions when
the policy space is multi-dimensional. The rst is the implementation of structure-induced
equilibria. By following Shepsle (1979), agents vote simultaneously, yet separately (i.e.
issue by issue), on the issues at stake. Votes are then aggregated over each issue by
the median voter. See Condez-Ruiz and Galsso (2005) for a more detailed discussion
of this approach. The second is the legislative bargaining approach, which stems from
the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and develops from Battaglini and Coate
(2006). This approach applies when legislatorsrst loyalty is to their constituents and
legislative coalitions are uid across time and issues. The last approach, which will be
exploited in this paper, concerns the adoption of probabilistic voting rule. While it dates
back to the 1970s, its resurgence in popularity stems from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) : It
applies to political environments where party discipline is strong and the winning political
party simply implements its platform. See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of
this framework.
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platform. Under a balanced budget constraint the political platform is rep-
resented by the pair (et; t). Since politicians can extract rents from being
in power, the objective of each candidate is to maximize support among the
currently living voters to win elections and implement the proposed policy,
with no ability to commit to future policies (opportunistic framework). In
the Nash equilibrium of the electoral competition game both candidates pro-
pose the same policy platform, implementing the utilitarian optimum with
respect to current voters.19 It follows that the political objective function,
Wt, which aggregates the political preferences of the two generations having
the right to vote has the following structural form:
Wt  (1 + n)W1;t [ft; ft+1; ht; ht+1; kt+1] + W2;t [ft; kt] (2.15)
where W1;t [] and W2;t [] are obtained after plugging condition (2.14) re-
spectively into Eq. (2.11) and Eq. (2.12).20 In the probabilistic voting
setting a relevant factor is the presence of unobservable ex-ante ideological
bias in voterspreferences toward political candidates. We consider the case
in which the adultsideological weight is normalized to unity and the olds
political power distribution is denoted by .21 If 0 <  < 1 then, on average,
the old cohort cares less about ideology and has more "swing-voters" than
the adult one. For  > 1 the opposite holds, where the preferences of the
old in the political debate represent the political majority. Finally, when 
= 1, all voters are equally represented.
Summarizing, individual electorate choices depend on the proposed scal
platform, on the impact of political programs on agentsprivate behavior,
and on an "ideology" that is orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimen-
sions. While elderly people care for current taxation and redistribution only,
the political choices for adults are also a¤ected by future expected policies.
Remark 8 Given the probabilistic environment described above the result-
ing political power distribution of voters, i.e. current old and adults, is
19Since candidates have no intrinsic preferences over taxation and redistribution, they
are assumed to implement their promised platform.
20For an analytical derivation see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
21 In other terms the parameter  is a measure of how strongly the old generation pursues
her own interest. In our framework, due to multidimensionality in the aggregation of
political preferences,  cannot be equal to zero, excluding possibility of dictatorship.
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represented by the nite-dimensional vector:
=p(3)  (; (1 + ) (1 + n)) 2 R2 (2.16)
Thus the relative political bargaining weights of current adults and old,
whose sum is one, are:

A (1 + n) (1 + )
+(1 + n) (1 + )
and 
O 
+(1 + n) (1 + )
(2.17)
respectively.
Remark 9 The more population ages (i:e: n decreases and  increases), the
smaller is the relative political weight of the adults (
A) and the larger is
the relative political weight of the old (
O).
At each time voting over a political platform generates dynamic linkages
of policies across periods. The standard logic of competitive models, where
agents optimize taking future equilibrium outcomes as given breaks down
when political choices are considered. Due to the non-negligible impact
of current political actions on future equilibria, rational agents internalize
these dynamic feedbacks. In our framework dynamic linkages generated by
physical and human capital arise both directly, a¤ecting asset accumulation
decision (direct dynamic feedbacks), and indirectly a¤ecting future political
choices (indirect dynamic feedbacks).22 While the implemented labor in-
come tax rate has a one-period lagged impact on the physical capital stock
due to full depreciation, intergenerational transfers in the form of education
have a two-period lagged impact on physical capital and innite persistency
on human capital due to the complementarity between parental human cap-
ital and education. Because of the di¤erent intensities of the dynamic feed-
backs, the internalization degree of future expectations drives the economy
towards di¤erent equilibrium outcomes. In order to explore the implications
concerning the dynamic persistence of the welfare state allowing for di¤erent
equilibrium concepts, we gradually incorporate all the dynamic feedbacks
generated by political choices. Focusing on Markov strategies, in which the
playersactions depend on the level of the fundamental state variables only,
22The persistency of dynamic linkages depends on the "type" of general equilibrium
e¤ects including in the model (i.e. endogenous prices, asset accumulation).
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physical capital and human capital, we analyze three di¤erent scenarios.
First, we explore the equilibrium dynamic policies under the assumption of
myopic voters. In this environment agents are supposed not to be able to
internalize the future.23 Second, we allow for dynamic rational expectations
in a nite time horizon. In this scenario agents are able to fully internalize
the overall direct and indirect impact of taxation and redistribution through
the evolution of assets and politicians are now endowed with strategic be-
havior. The basic idea is that by a¤ecting the evolution of the relevant state
variables current representatives may act strategically choosing the level of
both the labor income tax rate and intergenerational transfers which induce
higher total expected direct and indirect gains, fully anticipating the total
future impact of current choices.24 Finally in the next chapter we will an-
alyze an innite time horizon economy with a benevolent Central Planner,
which enables us to internalize the innitely-persistent feedback e¤ects of
policies on fundamental assets without political competition.
2.4.1 Myopic Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In myopic voting setting, where agents play Markovian strategies, the im-
plemented policy rules, fmt  (mt ; emt ), turns out to be serially uncorrelated
at each time. The apex m stands for myopic. No dynamic feedback e¤ects
generated by political choices are internalized in equilibrium. This is equiv-
alent to model static expectations, where future policies are taken as given,
fm  (m; em) ; ensuring a dynamically consistent sequence of policies. We
now provide the formal denition of myopic politico-economic equilibrium.
Denition 4 A myopic political SMPE is dened as a vector of di¤eren-
tiable policy decision rules, zm = (Tm;Em), where Tm : R  R  ! (0; 1)
and Em : R  R  ! (0; e^mt ) are the taxation policy rule and the public
23The myopic approach studies the politico-economic equilibrium concept under the as-
sumption that voters ability to predict is restricted. In this setup, even though the future
equilibrium paths need to be predicted for each current policy, the agents are not required
to take into account the impact of current political decisions on future ones. Voters only
take into account direct positive/negative impacts of current policies on their intertem-
poral utility. Consequently, the policies are not serially correlated and the maximization
program is essentially static, excluding the possibility to adopt strategic behavior.
24 In our environment governments dont try to manipulate voting behavior as Hassler
et al. (2003) do. This is due to the fact that we consider productive asset variables as
fundamental instead of demographic variables.
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higher education policy rule, mt = T
m [ht; kt] and emt = E
m [ht; kt], respec-
tively. Given the political indirect utility, Eq. (2.15), the following condition
must hold:
zm [ht; kt]  argmax
fmt
W [fmt ; ht; kt]
subject to the following set of constraints:
1: V [ht; kt] W [zm [] ; ht; kt] WLF [kt]
2:  [ht; kt] =
(
kt+1 = K [f
m
t ; ht]
ht+1 = H [e
m
t ; ht]
3: fmt 2  [ht; kt]
where WLF [] is the Eq. (2.15) in the laissez-faire case, H [] and K []
are dened in Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.10), and  [] is a continuous convex
correspondence.
The equilibrium condition requires that the policy control variables, fmt ,
have to be chosen by politicians in order to maximize the probability of
winning election when future policy outcomes fm are taken as given. The
vector of the implemented policy platform is feasible if the individual ratio-
nality constraint and the transformation constraints hold. To solve for the
equilibrium policy rules zm, we take the rst order derivatives of Eq. (2.15)
with respect to fmt applying the envelope theorem. The following rst order
conditions are achieved for mt and e
m
t , respectively:
0 =  (1 + n) (1 + ht)uC2;t| {z }
olds direct benet
  (1 + n) (1 + ht)uC1;t| {z }
adultsdirect cost
(2.18)
0 =  (1 + n)2uC2;t| {z }
olds direct cost
+ (1 + n)2
dht+1
demt
muC2;t+1| {z }
adultsexpected direct benet
(2.19)
The incentive scheme in the myopic case is characterized only by direct
e¤ects of political choices on voters indirect utility in terms of costs and
benets. Let us rst refer to Eq. (2.18) : At each time an interior solution
for the income tax rate is simply determined as the outcome of a weighted
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bargaining between current old and adults,25 who get benets and sustain
costs by a variation in the tax level. The rst term in Eq. (2.18) rep-
resents the olds marginal benets in terms of PAYG social security due
to the increase in the income tax rate. Since tax levying on labor income
makes adults sustain the whole tax burden, the second term captures the
adultsmarginal cost caused by a positive variation on the scal dimension.
Similarly, redistributive choices are taken as the outcome of a weighted bar-
gaining between current old and future ones.26 An increase in public higher
education transfers is a "double-edge sword". On the one hand it makes
the current old sustain direct costs due to a reduction in social security con-
tributions, represented by the rst part of Eq. (2.19) : On the other hand
the future old enjoy direct benets from the expected return of productive
investment in human capital, whose e¤ects are captured by the second part
of Eq. (2.19).27
Political SMPE with Myopia
Solving the above system of FOCs, we yield the myopic political SMPE
for interior solutions.28 Let m  (Km;t ;Hm;t ) \ Hm;et be the state-
space in which interior scal and redistributive policy rules are simultane-
ously obtained, where (Km;t ;H
m;
t ) =
n
(kt; ht) jkmt < kt < k^mt
o
andHm;et =
fhtjht 2 (0;1)g if h < 1(1 ) m otherwise Hm;et =
n
htjht 2

~hm;1
o
.29
Then the following Proposition applies:
25The bargaining absolute power weights for old and adults on the scal dimension in
the myopic case are respectively  and 1 + n: Clearly, the stronger is the olds political
power, the higher is the equilibrium level in the income tax rate.
26The bargaining absolute power weights of current and future old are respectively equal
to  and  (1 + n) :
27 It should be noted that the expected direct benets enjoyed by future old crucially
depends on the value of m. Thus, we need a criterion based on rational expectation
for the policy makers to correctly make predictions on future taxation and redistribution
policies as in the next paragraph.
28At any time t,  is di¤erent from zero. Given the concavity in both the instanta-
neous utility function and human capital production, we attain an interior solution for
both t and et at each time t. Equating Eq. (2.18) and (2.19) to zero and solving the
system, if interiority in both dimensions is yielded then human capital production has
to be characterized by decreasing return in education transfers. Otherwise we get either
corner solution in one of the two dimensions or indeniteness in the structural determi-
nation of the two policy rules. We rule out such circumstances adopting a Cobb-Douglas
technology.
29For the exact characterization of the threshold values kmt ; k^
m
t and ~h
m see the proof of
Proposition 5 reported in Appendix.
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Proposition 5 Let  m   1 R m 1 . For any (ht; kt) 2 m, the set of
feasible rational policies, fmt  (mt ; emt ), which can be supported by a myopic
political SMPE, has the following functional form:
(i)
Em [ht] = a
m
1 ht + a
m
0 (2.20)
where am1  1+n m and am0  1 1+nh m;
(ii)
Tm [ht; kt] =  bm3
kt
1 + ht
+ bm2
ht
1 + ht
+ bm1
1
1 + ht
+ bm0 (2.21)
where bm3  R
A; bm2   m


A +
1
(1 )
O

; bm1  h
 
1 


bm2 +

O
R ((1 + n) 
m   (1 + n)2em) and bm0  
O:
For any (ht; kt) =2 m, corner solutions result in at least one of the two
dimensions.
Proof. (See Appendix).
This Proposition characterizes the behavior of politicians in a myopic
environment when Markov strategies are implemented. From a structural
point of view, while the policy rule associated to education transfers is lin-
ear in human capital production, the scal policy rule is a linear function in
physical capital but not in the human capital level. The equilibrium condi-
tions predict the simultaneous existence of both sides of the redistributive
program for (ht; kt) 2 m.
Finally, the exact quantitative characterization of the scal policies cru-
cially depends on the expected values on both future policy dimensions
(em; m). Given the equilibrium Euler condition30 of et; i.e.
dht+1
det

et=Em
=
R
m , and the decreasing return in education investment, 
m positively a¤ects
the level of forward transfers through the parameter  m [m] : The higher the
expectation of the future income tax level is, the greater is the political sup-
port in public education spending in order to increase the future taxable in-
come and, in turn, compensate the lower private savings with pension bene-
ts. Moreover, the parameter b1 [em; m] of Eq. (2.21) captures the expected
value of the minimum pension benets, dened as a social program whose
30See Proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix for the analytical derivation.
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contributors are just the unskilled workers, i.e. pm = (1 + n) m (1+n)2em:
The higher the expected value on pm is, the greater is the size of government.
A more structured approach to correctly internalize the expectations
on future policies is then necessary in order to fully catch the strategic
component of political equilibrium decisions. To this aim, in the following
paragraph we introduce and develop a perfect forward-looking approach.
2.4.2 Politico-Economic Perfect Forward-looking Equilibrium
The deletion of the myopic information constraints modies dramatically the
dynamic programming problem, generating serial correlation among present
and future political choices. Agents are now able to strategically vote over
the political space internalizing both the direct dynamic feedbacks and the
partially indirect ones due to persistence of current policies on future po-
litical variables. As suggested by Krusell et al. (1997), in order to restrict
the set of possible equilibrium outcomes, we employ the di¤erentiable po-
litical SMPE with perfect foresight as equilibrium concept of our economy.
In Markov equilibria, the current political decisions may a¤ect the future
state variables, i.e. the current level of physical capital and human capital,
and thus the future labor income tax rate, education transfers and pension
benets. The denition of the equilibrium is given by:
Denition 5 A perfect foresight political SMPE is dened as a vector of
di¤erentiable policy decision rules, z = (T;E), where T : R  R  ! (0; 1)
and E : R  R  ! (0; e^t) are the taxation policy rule and the public higher
education policy rule, t = T [ht ; kt ] and et = E [ht ; kt ], respectively. Given
the political indirect utility, Eq. (2.15), the following conditions must hold:
(i)
z [ht; kt] = argmax
ft
W [ft; ft+1; ht; kt]
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subject to the following set of constraints:31
1: V [ht; kt] W [z [] ; ht; kt] WLF [kt]
2:  [ht; kt] =
(
kt+1 = K [ft;z [ht+1; kt+1] ; ht]
ht+1 = H [et; ht]
3: ft 2  [ht; kt]
where WLF [] is the Eq. (2.15) in the laissez-faire case, H [] and
K [] are dened in Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.10), and  [] is a continuous
convex correspondence.
(ii)
V [ht; kt] =M (V ) [ht; kt]
where the functional M : C1
 
R2
! C1  R2 is dened as follows:
M (V ) [ht; kt] := max
fc2c[h;k]
W [ft; ft+1; ht; kt]
The rst equilibrium condition requires the political control variables, ft;
have to be chosen in order to maximize the decisive voters indirect utility
function (2.15), taking into account that future redistribution and taxation
depend on the current policy choices via both the equilibrium private de-
cision and future equilibrium policy rules. The second condition requires
that, if an equilibrium exists, it must satisfy the xed point properties, i.e.
M () is a contraction. At this point note that the sequential resolution of
the optimization program leads to a time-inconsistent allocation. Since the
policies at time t + 1 inuence individual saving choices in period t, the
reoptimization in any period s > t would yield a rst order condition violat-
ing the one achieved at time t. To avoid the emergence of time-inconsistent
equilibrium policies, we allow for the current government to set its political
platform correctly foreseeing how the future government will set political
instruments. From a technical point of view, we are looking for two dif-
ferentiable policies which obey the recursive rules given by the vector of
31Di¤erently from Denition 4, in the perfect forward looking case the politicians take
care also of the impact current policies have on next-period one. Consequently the political
internalization relaxes the constraints requirements.
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functions ft = z [kt; ht], where z is an innite dimensional object and the
key endogenous variable of the problem. The second fundamental element
we are looking for is a function which describes the private sector response
to a one-shot deviation of the government, when agents expect future poli-
cies to be set by politicians according to z as a function of the current state
and of political control variables, kt+1 = ~K [ft; ht].32
Before solving recursively for the equilibrium policy rule z, we inves-
tigate the marginal impact of t and et on the welfare of the two decisive
voters groups. Maximizing Eq. (2.15) with respect to the policy vector
ft 2  [ht; kt] and applying the envelope theorem that cancels out the e¤ect
of the two political control variables via kt+1, we obtain the following system
of rst order conditions:
0 = (1 + n)(1 + ht)uC2;t| {z }
old0s direct benet
 (1 + n)(1 + ht)uC1;t| {z }
adultsdirect cost
(2.22)
+(1 + n)2uC2;t+1

(1 + ht+1)
d t+1
d t
 (1 + n)det+1
d t

| {z }
adultsexp. cost/benet
32The function ~K is known only conditioning on the existence of z:To derive ~K start
from Eq. (2.10):
kt+1 = K [ft; ft+1; ht]
Function K describes the equilibrium behavior of private agents as a function of current
state and both current and future policies. If there exists a di¤erentiable function z,
which describes the policy behavior followed by politicians in equilibrium, this rule can
be internalized by fully rational private agents. It follows that:
kt+1 = K [ft;z [kt+1; ht+1] ; ht]
Plugging the Eq. ht+1 = H [et; ht] into the above equation and rearranging the terms we
get:
kt+1 = ~K [ft; ht]
Due to the full depreciation of physical capital, ~K is not a function of current level of
physical capital, which strongly simplies the analyses.
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0 =  (1 + n)2uC2;t| {z }
olds direct cost
(2.23)
+(1 + n)2uC2;t+1

dht+1
det
t+1+(1 + ht+1)
dt+1
det
  (1 + n)det+1
det

| {z }
adultsexpected direct/indirect cost/benet
Di¤erently from the FOCs resulting in the myopic case, conditions (2.22)
and (2.23) internalize the strategic e¤ects, capturing how politicians can
a¤ect future policies through their current choices of ft: If
dt+1
dt
> 0 (< 0)
and dt+1det > 0 (< 0) agents know that a higher income tax rate and larger
education transfers lead to a higher (lower) tax rate in the future. Thus,
di¤erently from the case where the current political choices do not a¤ect
future policy outcome, representatives may strategically increase (reduce)
t and et in order to distort the tax rate outcome of tomorrow. The same
idea holds for et+1.
Political SMPE with Perfect Foresight
Due to the non-linearity and bidimensionality in the political space, the
system of partial di¤erential equations (2.22) and (2.23) cannot be easily
solved using integration methods.33 We start by solving simultaneously for
the maximization of the decisive voter with respect to the income tax rate
and the level of public higher education transfers. As reported in Klein et al.
(2008) the equilibrium is obtained as the limit of a nite-horizon equilibrium,
whose characteristics do not signicantly depend on the time horizon, as long
as the time horizon is long enough. Consequently our resolution strategy
consists in a constructive approach (induction method). We compute the
FOCs dening the feasible equilibrium policy rules in a nite-horizon envi-
ronment via backward induction. We start at a nal round t < 1 and we
re-compute the equilibrium policy rules, zt = (Et;Tt), as long as all the
direct dynamic feedbacks, induced by political choices on private one, have
been internalized. In particular, due to two-periods lagged impact of et on
33See for example Grossman-Helpman (1996) and Azariadis-Galasso (2002) frameworks
in which by applying the envelope theorem the di¤erential equation becomes linear and
solution results straightforward to determine.
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private saving choice, we will perform recursive maximization until period
t  2. At each time the political objective function, described in Eq. (2.15),
has to be simultaneously maximized with respect to its arguments, i.e. the
pair (et; t), subject to the Euler condition of the economic optimization
problem, the balanced budget constraint, the individual rationality condi-
tion and the equilibrium policy rules of the following periods, computed via
backward procedure. Once a recursive structure is identiable, by making
the time horizon go to innity for all the time-variant coe¢ cients determined
so far, we obtain the equilibrium policy rules as xed point of the recursive
problem in a multidimensional environment.
Fixing  = 12 , we analytically determine a fundamental equilibrium cap-
turing the e¤ects that are inherent in the dynamic game itself, which turns
out to be unique. Let p  (Kt ;Ht ) \ Het ; dened as in the previous
paragraph, be the state-space in which interior policy rules are obtained.
Furthermore, let R  1+nR (1+n) be an index measuring the economys dy-
namic e¢ ciency. The following Proposition then applies:
Proposition 6 Let   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

. Under the dynamic
e¢ ciency condition, for any (ht; kt) 2 p the set of feasible rational policies,
ft  (et; t) ; which can be supported by a perfect foresight political SMPE,
has the following functional form:
(i)
E [ht] = a1ht + a0 (2.24)
where a1  1+n  and a0  1 1+nh ;
(ii)
T [kt; ht] =  b3 kt
1 + ht
+ b2
ht
1 + ht
+ b1
1
1 + ht
+ b0 (2.25)
where b0  
O, b1  h1  b2+ R
 
1 + h (1  ) 
O, b2   (
A+
2
O) and b3  R
A.
Otherwise, for any (ht; kt) =2 p corner solutions result in at least one of
the two dimensions.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The Proposition characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of public choices
in a fully rational environment when Markov strategies are implemented.
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The dynamic e¢ ciency requirement, R > 1+n, is a necessary condition
for the simultaneous existence of PAYG and public education programs. In
our economy, during the transition path, the implicit net return to pen-
sions is determined by both the population growth rate and the marginal
increase in taxable income due to human capital investment net of the fu-
ture resources devoted to education. As long as the implicit net return is
higher than the capital rental price, there will emerge incentives in investing
simultaneously in both sides of the redistribution programs. By contradic-
tion, suppose that the population growth rate exceeds the net rental price
to physical capital, then it is straightforward to prove that b1 tends to in-
nity34 and consequently the asset variable H [] has a negative marginal
impact on the size of government. Thus, according to Eq. (2.3) and (2.25),
an increase in education spending would determine a positive variation in
the stock of human capital and in turn a decrease in tax rate. Consequently,
physical capital increases inducing further reduction in the future tax level.
This cannot be an equilibrium since, given R < 1 + n, agents always have
an incentive to deviate by choosing a higher level of income tax rate in or-
der to depress private saving and guarantee a higher future level in pension
contributions even without investment in education. As long as the econ-
omy is dynamic ine¢ cient the simultaneous existence of both forward and
backward transfers is excluded. We depart from the traditional literature
on redistributive policies, where no endogenous human capital formation
is modelled, which states that social security survives just in an economy
characterized by a population growth rate higher than the rental price.35
The two policy rules in the perfect foresight equilibrium are structurally
equivalent to the policy functions in the myopic case. The political decision
on the education transfers solely depends linearly on the stock of human cap-
ital, while the scal tax is a non-linear combination of kt and ht. Instead,
the major di¤erence between the two equilibrium concepts concerns their
quantitative predictions through the two distinct channels illustrated in the
previous section. First, all the elements of Eq. (2.24) and (2.25) a¤ected
by ht are scaled by the di¤erence between   and  m, which incorporates
34See Proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix for the derivation of b1:
35Contrary to the previous literature based on dynamic ine¢ ciency condition, our frame-
work has the advantage to be more realistic. Consistently with data from World War II
onward, OECD countries faced higher rental price to capital with respect to population
growth rate. For a complete discussion see Abel (1987) :
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how perfectly rational voters, di¤erently from myopic ones, create their own
expectation on the future income tax. Second, the coe¢ cient b1 internalizes
the expectations on the future value of the pension benets, mostly incorpo-
rated in the dynamically e¢ cient index R. the more the population growth
rate tends to the return to physical capital, which induces an increase in R,
the more voters are willing to substitute private savings with public ones.
This turns out in a higher political support for income tax.
As depicted in Figure 2:1, for any non-zero level of the income tax rate,
the larger the human capital is, the more political support the education
program receives, i.e. detdht = a1 > 0. Two di¤erent congurations may
arise depending on the level of societys human capital endowment. As
shown in Panel (a) ; as long as h < 1(1 )  , E [ht] lies within the feasibility
boundaries, (0; e^t) ; for any level of human capital. Instead, as reported in
Panel (b), if h > 1(1 )  , there exists a threshold value of parental human
capital, ~h  1 h(1 )   1 ; such that for any level of ht lower than ~h boundary
solution is attained, i.e. E [ht] = e^t.
Figure 2:1: Education Transfers Policy Rule
In other terms, due to complementarity between the inputs employed in
the skill technology, the whole tax revenue is devoted to investment in public
education and no social security program is implemented. Otherwise, if ht is
higher than ~h, the larger the stock of human capital is, the lower is the vari-
ation in education transfers and consequently the atter is the equilibrium
policy function. Indeed, due to the decreasing returns in parental human
capital, in equilibrium politicians set positive transfers both for education
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and social security.36
Remark 10 E [ht] does not depend on strategic political components embed-
ded in the parameter . For the determination of the transfers level, only
the mass e¤ect component, n, matters.
As reported in Proposition 6, in equilibrium the amount of education
transfers has to be equal to the highest feasible value of forward spending
which maximizes the net implicit rate of future pensions. In other terms
E [ht] maximizes the intertemporal utility of current adults without consid-
ering the political distortions due to the olds bargaining power. This result
sounds counterintuitive because, as shown in Eq. (2.23), the old actually
have incentives in reducing the education amount at the minimal level. This
in turn, under dynamic e¢ ciency, would remove the adultsincentives in sub-
stituting private saving with public one. As a nal result the laissez-faire
economy would be established. It cannot be an equilibrium for the setting
of an intergenerational contract and, as a consequence, the emergence of a
public education program not distorted by the political bias is justied.
Figure 2:2 reports the equilibrium scal policy rule described in Eq.
(2.25). For illustrative purposes, it is useful to analyze separately the e¤ects
of the two asset variables on T [ht; kt]. Panel (a) describes the structural
relation between the equilibrium tax rate and the level of ht where the
intercept, T [kt; 0] ; is a decreasing function in physical capital. As long as
kt < ~k where ~k  b1 b2b3 , the larger the human capital is, the higher is the
opportunity cost to tax levy, i.e. dtdht < 0. If instead kt > ~k, incentives to
increase simultaneously the taxable income and the income tax rate arise,
i.e. dtdht > 0.
36Note that the scenario characterized by the whole tax revenue devoted to public higher
education investments, i.e. no current pension benets, is an equilibrium outcome only
as long as one-period future pension transfers are allocated to current adults. In other
terms, when h  1
(1 )  and ht <
~h; there exists an initial condition ~h0 such that for
any h0 > ~h0; due to public investments in higher education, future human capital level
exceeds the threshold level ~h, i.e. ht+1  ~h. In this case adults have incentive in taxing
their income because of the future expected benets in terms of PAYG social security. Thus
there emerges a one-period-equilibrium characterized by an intergenerational contract with
current backward transfers equal to zero. Otherwise, if h0 < ~h0; then no future pensions
will be set for current adults and no incentive to implement an intergenerational contracts
may emerge.
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Figure 2:2: Income Tax Policy Rule
Panel (b) illustrates the structural relation between the equilibrium tax
rate and the level of kt: The equilibrium predicts for any value of kt the
higher the physical capital is, the lower is the income tax rate, consistently
with previous literature.37 The intuition for the scal policy function to
be non-increasing in the capital stock is the following. By contradiction, if
T [ht; kt] were increasing in kt, current adults would have incentive to save
in order to provide the next generation with a higher level of capital and
therefore receive a higher pension. This cannot be an equilibrium, since the
higher amount of backward transfer reduces the level of saving that workers
are willing to make.
Remark 11 T [ht; kt] crucially depends on both the strategic political com-
ponent embedded in the parameter  and the demographic component, n, for
the determination of the size of government.
Due to the distortions induced by taxation on saving choices and the
politiciansopportunistic behavior, a strategic persistency criterion drives
the setting of the income tax rate. In our environment human capital plays
a crucial role in two di¤erent ways. On the one hand it mitigates the politi-
ciansstrategic behavior. Precisely, the higher the level of human capital is,
the atter is the equilibrium policy function and the lower is the elasticity of
T [ht; kt] with respect to physical capital. The lower responsiveness of tax-
ation policy decisions on the level of private savings weakens the strategic
37See among others Grossman and Helpman (1998), Forni (2005), Bassetto (2008).
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channel through which politicians can extract rent to win elections. On the
other hand human capital, through the choice in education transfers, per-
turbs the political choice concerning the size of government. Depending on
the political bargaining intensity between adults and old embedded in the
coe¢ cients b1 and b2 of Eq. (2.25), the marginal impact of human capital
on taxation decisions can be either positive or negative, as already pointed
out in the above analyses of the equilibrium tax structure. Formally, let us
dene 
O  ( (1 )
h) 
(2(1 )h+) + R , the following relation holds:(
b2 < b1
b2 > b1
i¤
i¤

O > 
O

O  
O
(2.26)
The relation states that an economy where 
O  
O experiences a political
competition characterized by weak bargaining power of the old and b1 6 b2.
If 
O > 
O, then the old exert a strong bargaining power and b1 > b2.
To summarize, a complete description of the recursive Markovian struc-
ture including both the economic environment and the political scenario is
represented in Figure 2:3.
Figure 2 :3 : Markovian Structure
The picture points out the strategic relations which provide the necessary
incentives to selsh agents to sustain simultaneously backward redistributive
policies and forward ones, i.e. (et; pt), as described above.
Welfare State Regimes
Figure 2:2 points out the strategic structural relation between the income
tax rate and human capital in the Markovian environment, which drives
the economy towards di¤erent welfare state regimes. If pure political fac-
tors matter in splitting the public spending, then a political welfare regime
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will emerge. If economic factors are also relevant, then a politico-economic
welfare regime will arise. The following Corollary fully characterizes the
conditions for the identication of the di¤erent regime congurations:
Corollary 2 Given the stationary equilibrium policy rules T [ht; kt] and
E [ht]:
(a) if b1 6 b2, then the Politico Complementarity Welfare Regime, PCR,
arises, i.e. dtdht > 0;
(b) if b1 > b2 and kt > ~k, then the Politico-Economic Complementarity
Welfare Regime, PECR, arises, i.e. dtdht > 0;
(c) if b1 > b2 and kt < ~k, then the Politico-Economic Substitutability Wel-
fare Regime, PESR, arises, i.e. dtdht < 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
While economic factors driving the system into di¤erent welfare state
regimes are endogenously determined by capital asset accumulation through
the saving choices, i.e. ktR~k, political factors depend on the relative bar-
gaining power between the adults and the old, i.e. b2Rb1. An economy char-
acterized by a weak level of old bargaining power in the political process,
i.e. b1 6 b2, will experience a PCR, for any level of kt. Contrarily, an econ-
omy with a strong level of old bargaining power in the political arena, i.e.
b1 > b2, will experience a PECR if the system is high-capitalized, i.e. kt>~k,
otherwise a PESR will emerge if the economy is low-capitalized, i.e. kt<~k.
Intuitively, as already pointed out, in equilibrium a higher level of the
current income tax rate will determine a decrease of the future physical
capital stock and, consequently, an increase of the future tax rate. In the
PCR welfare state regime, adults anticipate that, if they invest in education
today, an increase in future human capital will determine a further positive
variation in the level of income tax rate tomorrow. Given the increase in both
the future tax rate and taxable income, i.e. gross future pension benets,
which maximize the adultsintertemporal utility, PCR emerges as the only
sustainable welfare state regime when adult bargaining power prevails.
To fully characterize the public spending process, based on the welfare
state regime criterion, we move the analyses to the equilibrium characteri-
zation for pension benets.
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Corollary 3 Under decreasing return in education, the impact of education
spending on social security transfers is always positive, i.e. dpt+1det > 0:
Proof. (See Appendix).
Remark 12 The existence of a PAYG social security program supports pub-
lic investment in higher education even in absence of altruism.38
Independently from the welfare state regime characterizing the economy,
an increase in public education transfers induces higher pension benets in
the future, creating the incentive for adults in supporting the education
program. Ceteris paribus, by supporting a higher education cost today, the
adults internalize that it will generate a higher taxable income tomorrow,
guaranteeing a higher level of pension benets when they will be old, for
any level of T [].
The interaction between political and economic institutions determines
the amount and the dynamic evolution of the pension system.
Corollary 4 At each time t, for any given level of human capital, in PESR
pension benets are lower then the PCR and larger then the PECR, i.e.
pPECRt < p
PESR
t < p
PCR
t .
Proof. (See Appendix).
Under rational expectations, when the adultsbargaining power is su¢ -
ciently strong, i.e. b1 6 b2 and PCR arises, the equilibrium pension benets
reach the highest feasible level. Otherwise, when the old prevail in the po-
litical debate, depending on the physical capital stock, the pension benets
are lower in a high-capitalized economy then in a low-capitalized one.
To resume graphically, in Figure 2:4 we plot on the state-space (ht; kt) as
illustrative case the welfare state regime congurations which arises under
certain parametersconditions when h > 1(1 )  and h0 > ~h0.
39 Panel (a)
shows the case in which a weak level of adult bargaining power characterizes
38When no public education transfers are provided, et = 0 the bidimensional political
space degenerates to the unidimensional case in an economy characterized by no human
capital accumulation and consequently general equilibrium e¤ects. This type of economy
was studied among others by Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Azariadis and Galasso
(2002) :
39 It should be noted that if h  1
(1 )  , then human capital does not play any role in
splitting public spending between education and retirement transfers. In other terms, it
avoids the interesting case with pension benets set to zero.
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the political scenario. Contrarily, Panel (b) allows for a strong bargaining
power of the adults.
Figure 2:4: Panel (a) shows the case for b2<b1, Panel (b) shows the case for b2>b1:
As long as kt < kt in both cases full expropriation occurs. The tax
rate, equal to 100% of labor income, is assigned either to nance only the
public education program if ht < ~h or to support both redistributive so-
cial programs if ht > ~h. Di¤erently, as long as kt > k^t the laissez-faire
equilibrium emerges. Panel (a) reports the politico-economic parameters
congurations which make PECR and PESR arise, i.e. b2 + b0 < 1 and
b1 + b0 > 1, whereas panel (b) shows the emergence of PCR due the pure
political factors, i.e. b2 > b1.
Aging
Quantitatively, one of the most severe challenges concerning the intergenera-
tional transfer system in developed economies regards the impact of popula-
tion aging both in demographic (n) and political () terms. Demographic ag-
ing, which represents the quantitative component of the aging phenomenon,
decreases partially the returns from a PAYG system in our economy char-
acterized by endogenous human capital formation. Political aging, which
represents the qualitative component of aging phenomenon, gives retirees
stronger claim over pension benets even on constant demographic terms.
Based on the characterization of the political equilibrium, we now consider
how aging a¤ects the policy decisions of representatives who face electoral
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constraints in the form of both the size of the welfare state, represented by
the tax rate T, and the amount of intergenerational transfers, E and P.
Focusing on political aging the following Corollary holds:
Corollary 5 Political aging, i.e. the increase in ; has no quantitative
impact on the education transfers, dEd = 0, and induces an increase in the
income tax rate, dTd > 0. It follows that, for any level of
h, dPd > 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
The political e¤ect is captured by a decrease in the political weight of
the adults, that is, an increase in the political weight of the old. A stronger
ideological pressure of the old in the political debate implies a higher income
tax rate. This in turn determines a larger social security system supported
by voting. Given the e¢ ciency criterion driving the implementation of public
education policy, the overall e¤ect of political aging does not distort E.
Corollary 6 The demographic aging, i.e. the decrease in n, induces an
increase in education transfers, dEdn < 0, and has an ambiguous impact on
the income tax rate, dTdn R 0. It follows
dP
dn R 0.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Departing from previous literature suggesting the size of social security
to be increasing in population growth, our model predicts under which para-
metric condition the inverse relation also appears. Specically, demographic
aging has an ambiguous impact on the amount of pension transfers in per-
capita terms. A rst interesting case arises when the margin R  (1 + n) is
su¢ ciently small, which in turns implies, even without considering the hu-
man capital return, the implicit return to pensions to be close to the gross
return to private saving. It gives incentives in a younger society to opt for
higher pension benets due to their larger demographic return, i.e. dPdn > 0.
A second illustrative case emerges when the relative political weight of the
adults is larger than R and h is su¢ ciently high. In this scenario, even
if population ages and, in turn, the demographic pension returns decrease,
adults have incentives to depress the current level of savings in order to
compensate the smaller number of future tax payers with a higher tax rate
level tomorrow, i.e. dPdn < 0.
70 Chapter 2
Dynamics and Steady States
We now discuss the transition dynamics of the economy during the adjust-
ment towards the steady state.
Denition 6 The laws of motion of the collection fet; t; ht; ktgt are denite
as the mappings:
ht+1 = H [E [ht] ; ht] ,
et+1 = E [H [E [ht] ; ht]] ,
kt+1 = ~K [E [ht] ;T [ht; kt] ; ht] ,
t+1 = T
h
~K [E [ht] ; t; ht] ;H [E [ht] ; ht]
i
.
The economys dynamics are basically driven by human capital evolution
which a¤ects both the education transferslaw of motion and the transition
dynamics of taxation policy. While the former is directly inuenced only
by human capital, the latter is a¤ected by human capital both directly and
indirectly through physical capital. This implies that convergence condi-
tions in the state-space are also su¢ cient for the stable convergence of the
policy rules evolution. The following Lemma states the conditions for the
economys convergence.
Lemma 5 Let    (R  (1 + n)) and n 
r
2R

R pR2   

    1.
Given any feasible initial condition (h0; k0), if  >  and n > n, then the
collection fet; t; ht; ktgt is characterized by stable monotonic convergence.
The speed of convergence for t crucially depends on the initial condition, the
exogenous societys human capital endowment and the welfare state regime
characterization.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Given the di¤erentiability of the policy functions, the interior solution
conditions and Lemma 5, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 7 A feasible steady state fe; ; h; kg exists and is unique.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Thus, depending on the initial condition, (h0; k0), and the level of the
exogenous human capital endowment, h, the control and the state variables
converge monotonically to the unique feasible steady state. According to
the specic emerging welfare state regime di¤erent speeds of convergence
and amounts of intergenerational transfers characterize the economy.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the conditions for the emergence of implicit
intergenerational contracts without assuming reputation mechanisms, com-
mitment technology and altruism. We present a tractable dynamic politico-
economic model in an OLG environment where political representatives com-
pete by proposing multidimensional scal platforms. Both backward and
forward intergenerational transfers, respectively in the form of pension ben-
ets and higher education investments, are simultaneously considered in an
endogenous human capital setting with distortionary income taxation when
agents play Markovian strategies.
The dynamic mechanisms driving our results are intuitive: The social
security system sustains investment in public education that, in turn, creates
a dynamic linkage across periods through both human and physical capital
driving the economy towards di¤erent welfare state regimes.
We show that intergenerational contracts can be politically sustained
uniquely as long as the economy is dynamically e¢ ciency, i.e. the rental
gross price of capital is larger than the economic growth rate, with underac-
cumulation of physical capital. Departing from the previous literature, our
economic environment is in line with empirical ndings on the dynamic e¢ -
ciency status of most developed countries, especially after the demographic
transition. By endogenizing human capital formation through public edu-
cation investments, backward and forward redistributive programs may op-
timally self-sustain each other even in the absence of a benevolent Central
Planner. In equilibrium political decisions are no education strategic, while
due to distortionary taxation and the politicians opportunistic behavior,
strategic persistency underlies the determination of the income tax rate.
Relatively to the predictions about the transition towards the steady
state, we nd that three di¤erent welfare state regimes may emerge depend-
ing on both the relative political bargaining power between adults and old
and the endogenous capital asset accumulation. The emergence of di¤erent
regimes leads the economy towards di¤erent dynamic paths and persistence
degrees of distortionary redistribution. Under rational expectations, in the
regime supported by the adults, the equilibrium pension benets reach the
highest feasible level.
Demographic aging increases the equilibrium per-capita level of forward
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transfers, i.e. public education spending. Due to the decreasing return in
human capital accumulation aging does not always exacerbate the generous
behavior of the politicians towards the elderly. Political aging has instead a
positive impact on taxation but no e¤ects on the level of public education
investments.
Our analysis leaves some natural direction open for future research. We
have assumed that only adults and old compete in the political debate.
Using the developed methodology, relaxing the voting rule by considering
youth enfranchisement would generate even further distortions on the deter-
mination of education transfers and the government size. Another direction
for future research concerns the introduction of a dynamic electoral stage by
endogenizing the probability of re-election, which would introduce another
source of distortion.
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2.6 Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition (5). In order to prove Proposition (5), we look for
a feasible interior solution of fmt  (emt ; mt ) 2  [ht; kt], when the rational-
ity constraint and the transformation constraints hold. The proof will be
performed in two steps. First, we compute the rst order condition and we
check the feasibility conditions. Second, we will show that the specic solu-
tion found satises the rst order necessary and the second order su¢ cient
conditions of the problem and, therefore, it is a proper solution.
First step
Given fm  (emt ; mt ), maximizing equation (2.15) with respect to the
vector fmt , and applying the envelope theorem, we get the rst order con-
ditions given by Eq. (2.18) and (2.19). After some algebra the following
system of Euler equations is attained:8<:
uC2;t
uC1;t
= 1
uC2;t
uC1;t
= 
m
R
dht+1
demt
(1A)
Equating the two conditions above, for dht+1demt =
1 
(1+n)

ht+(1 )h
emt

we de-
termine the equilibrium value of public higher education policy rule, em [ht],
as follows:
Em [ht] = a
m
1 ht + a
m
0 (2A)
where  m   1 R m 1 , am0  h(1 )1+n  m and am1  1+n m. Plugging Eq.
(2A) into the rst order condition and after some rearrangements, the equi-
librium scal policy rule, Tm [ht; kt], has the following functional form:
Tm [ht; kt] =  bm3
kt
1 + ht
+ bm2
ht
1 + ht
+ bm1
1
1 + ht
+ bm0 (3A)
where bm0  
O; bm1  (1  )h m(
A+ 11 
O)+
OR ((1 + n) m (1 + n)2 em);
bm2   m(
A+ 11 
O) and bm3  R
A:
To determine the interiority conditions of the equilibrium scal policy
rule we check on the double inequality condition 0 < Tm [ht; kt] < 1 where
k^mt  b
m
2 +b
m
0
bm3
ht +
bm1 +b
m
0
bm3
and kmt  b
m
2 +b
m
0  1
bm3
ht +
bm1 +b
m
0  1
bm3
are the feasible
upper and lower capital threshold value, respectively. We denote the bidi-
mensional state-space, which delimits the interior solutions for the income
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tax rate, as follows:
(Km;t ;H
m;
t ) =
n
(ht; kt) jkmt < kt < k^mt
o
If kt < kmt , then the full expropriability regime is theoretically reachable.
Otherwise, if kt > k^mt , then the laissez-faire economy characterized by zero
tax rate is the equilibrium solution. To determine the state-space conditions
for interior solution on redistributive dimension, we check on the double
inequality condition 0 < Em [ht]  e^mt . The feasible upper threshold value
of education transfer, e^mt =
1
1+n +
1
1+nht, is obtained from balanced budget
constraint, Eq. (2.14), when 1) the equality condition holds, Em [ht] =
e^mt , 2) tax revenue is maximum, (1 + n) (1 + ht), and 3) pension transfers
are equal to zero. Plugging e^mt into the above inequality, we require the
conditions 0 <
h(1 )
1+n  
m + 1+n 
mht <
1
1+n +
1
1+nht to hold. The state-
space, which delimits interior solutions for the education transfers policy, is
then equal to:
Hm;et =
( fhtjht 2 (0;1)gn
htjht 2 (~hm;1)
o if h < 1(1 ) m
if h  1(1 ) m
where ~hm  1 h(1 ) m 1  m. Otherwise, if ht < ~hm the whole tax revenue is
devoted to public higher education transfers and no positive pension system
is feasible. Considering jointly the interiority feasibility conditions for mt
and emt , we obtain the state-space, 
m, which delimits interior solutions of
the myopic maximization problem:
m  (Km;t ;Hm;t ) \Hm;et
Second step
We now check for the second order su¢ cient condition of the problem.
Let z [x; q [x]] be a function in the variable x. From now on, we adopt the
following notation zxtyt  d
2z
dxtdyt
, where xt and yt are equal to et or t, to
indicate the second total di¤erential. The second order conditions are:
W=(1 + n) (1 + ht) ((1 + ht)
 
 (1 + n)uC22;t+uC11;t

+(1 + n)
dkt+1
dmt
uC11;t)
We = (1 + n)
2 (1 + ht) (  (1 + n)uC22;t+
dkt+1
dem;t
uC11;t)
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Wee=(1 + n)
2 ( (1 + n)2 uC22;t+
m
R
d2ht+1
demt de
m
t
uC1;t 
1 + n
R
m
dht+1
demt
dkt+1
demt
uC11;t)
We=   (1 + n)3 (1 + ht)uC22;t  
(1 + n)2
R
m
dht+1
demt
uC11;t((1 + n)+ (1 + ht)
dkt+1
dmt
)
where under logarithmic structure, from equation (2.10), dkt+1dmt =  

(1+)(1+n)(1+
ht) and
dkt+1
demt
=   1R(1+) mdht+1demt .
Note that W < 0; We > 0; Wee < 0 and We > 0. The determinant
of the Hessian matrix is then larger than zero only if WWee > WeWe .
Given the equilibrium condition described in Eq. (1A), 
m
R
dht+1
demt
= 1, after
rearranging the terms, the above inequality condition is equivalent to:
(1 + n)3
R
m (1 + ht)
d2ht+1
demt de
m
t
uC1;t( (1 + n) (1 + ht)uC22;t+(1 + ht+(1 + n)
dkt+1
dmt
)uC11;t)> 0
(4A)
Due to concavity of utility function and human capital production, LHS of
Eq. (4A) is proved to be greater or equal to zero in all the parameter space.
Thus the objective function is locally concave in the bidimensional space,
m, and the equilibrium policy rules (2A) and (3A) are the feasible solution
of the problem.
Proof of Proposition (6). Following Klein et al. (2008), our resolution
strategy consists in two stages. In the rst step we will compute the rst
order conditions subject to: 1 ) the Euler condition of the economic optimiza-
tion problem, Eq. (2.9), 2 ) the balanced budget constraint, Eq. (2.14), and
3 ) the equilibrium policy rules of the following periods, computed via back-
ward procedure. After having determined the conditions for the existence of
xed points, in the second step we will show that the specic solution found,
satisfying the rst order necessary and second order su¢ cient conditions of
the problem, is a proper solution.
First step
Suppose the economy ends at time t < 1 and that adults at that time
have one period temporal-horizon. Thus, the political objective function is
as follows:
Wt  (1 + n)u [C1;t [t; ht]] + u [C2;t [pt; kt]] (5A)
where C1;t  (1 + ht) (1  t) and C2;t  (1 + n)Rkt+pt. At time t there are
no incentives in investing in education, et = 0. Assuming interior solution,
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the scal dimension, t, is determined according to the Euler condition, as
follows:
uC2;t
uC1;t
=
1

(6A)
Under logarithmic utility, the functional form of the equilibrium scal policy
rule at time t is t =  R
A;t kt1+ht + 
O;t where 
A;t  1+n1+n+ and 
O;t 

1+n+ . Consequently, the equilibrium policy rules, zt = (Et;Tt), are equal
to:
zt :
(
Tt =  b1(0) kt1+ht + b0(0)
Et = 0
(7A)
where b1(0)  R
A;t and b0(0)  
O;t: The number in the brackets represents
the number of iterations.
Next we consider period t  1, in which adults born at time t  2 live up
three periods. Due to three-periods e¤ects of the political variable et not all
the intergenerational direct dynamic feedbacks are internalized at time t  1
and further recursion is necessary. The political objective function is now
as follows:
Wt 1  (1 + n)W1;t 1 [ft 1; ft; ht 1; ht; kt] + W2;t 1 [ft 1; kt 1] (8A)
where W1;t 1 []  u [C1;t 1 [t 1; ht 1; kt]] + u [C2;t [kt; pt]] and W2;t [] 
u[C2;t 1[kt 1; pt 1]]. After plugging the equilibrium policy rules (7A) of
the previous period into Eq. (8A) ; we maximize with respect to ft 1 
(et 1; t 1). Applying envelope theorem, after some algebra, we get the
following system of Euler equations:8<:
uC2;t 1
uC1;t 1
= 1++(+1+n)
uC2;t 1
uC1;t 1
= 1R

1+
+(+1+n)

dht
det 1
(9A)
Equating the two conditions in (9A), we get the necessary condition for
the determination of the equilibrium level of et 1, i.e. dhtdet 1 = R: Recalling
that at time t, ht =

ht 1+(1 )h
1+n

e1 t 1 , then plugging
dht
det 1 into the
equilibrium condition, we derive the equilibrium public education transfers
at time t   1: Let us denote  (1) 
 
1 
R
 1
 and (1) =
1+n
R . Solving the
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system (9A), the equilibrium policy rules are then equal to:
zt 1 :
(
Tt 1 =  b4(1) kt 11+ht 1 + b3(1)
ht 1
1+ht 1 + b2(1)
h
1+ht 1 + b1(1)
1
1+ht 1 + b0(1)
Et 1 = a1(1)ht 1 + a0(1)
(10A)
where a0(1)  (1 )
h
1+n  (1), a1(1)  1+n (1) and b0(1)  
O;t 1, b1(1) 
(1)
O;t 1, b2(1)  (1  ) 
A;t 1 (1), b3(1)  


A;t 1 + 1(1 )
O;t 1

 (1)
and b4(1)  R
A;t 1: Now 
O;t 1  
O  +(1+n)(1+) and 
A;t 1  
A 
(1+n)(1+)
+(1+n)(1+) are, respectively, the indexes of the relative olds and adults
political power in an economy that lasts more than one period.
Finally let us consider time t 2. At that all the direct dynamic feedbacks
are internalized. The political objective function is equivalent to equation
(8A), then it is not reported. The recursive problem is now subject to the
equilibrium policy rules (7A) and (10A) of the previous two periods. Max-
imizing the political objective function with respect to ft 2  (et 2; t 2)
the system of Euler conditions are:8><>:
uC2;t 2
uC1;t 2
= 1+(1+n)
uC2;t 2
uC1;t 2
= 1R(+(1+n))

1 + 1 
 
1 
R
 1


dht 1
det 2
(11A)
Let us now denote with  (2) 


R
 
1 
R
 1
 + 1 R
 1

and (2)  1+nR + 
1+n
R
2
. Furthermore, let us introduce the following notation g(2)  1+nR  (1)+
 (2): As before, solving the system (11A) we yield the following pair of equi-
librium policy rules at time t  2 :
zt 2 :
(
Tt 2 =  b4(2) kt 11+ht 1 + b3(2)
ht 1
1+ht 1 + b2(2)
h
1+ht 1 + b1(2)
1
1+ht 1 + b0(2)
Et 2 = a1(2)ht 1 + a0(2)
(12A)
where b0(2)  b0(1), b1(2)  (2)
O, b2(2) (1  )


A+
1
1 
O

 (2)+

1 
Og(2)

,
b3(2)  (2)(
A+ 11 
O), b4(2)  b4(1) and a0(2) 
(1 )h
1+n  (2), a1(2) 

1+n (2).
It is straightforward to show that  (2) can be derived as a di¤erentiable
monotonic transformation of  (1), m [:], characterized by m [0] > 0, m > 0
and m  > 0: In particular m

 (1)

=
 

R  (1) +
1 
R
 1
 : The argument can
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be repeated for each time j > 0 such that:
 (j+1) = m

 (j)

(13A)
Furthermore for each j the following series can be derived:
(j) 
jX
l=1

1 + n
R
l
g(j) 

1 + n
R
j 1
 (1) +

1 + n
R
j 2
 (2) + :::+  (j)
Using the above notation, starting from t   3 we can nally derive the
recursive structure which characterizes the political problem:
zt j :
(
Tt j =  b4(j) kt j1+ht j + b3(j)
ht j
1+ht j + b2(j)
h
1+ht j + b1(j)
1
1+ht j + b0(j)
Et j = a1(j)ht j + a0(j)
(14A)
where a0(j)  (1 )
h
1+n  (j), a1(j)  1+n (j) and b0(j)  b0(1), b1(j)  (j)
O,
b2(j)  (1  ) ((
A+ 11 
O) (j)+ 1 
Og(j)), b3(j)   (j)


A +
1
(1 )
O

,
b4(j)  b4(1).
If a political SMPE exists, then the limits for j !1 of the set of time-
variant parameters

a0(j); a1(j); b0(j); b1(j); b2(j); b3(j); b4(j)
	
exist and are -
nite. Note that the xed points determination for the two stationary policy
rules crucially depends on the existence of the xed point of the policy e
and, in nal instance, on the determination of the limit for  (j). Thus we
start with the redistributive policy dimension. The computation consists in
solving the non-linear di¤erence equation (13A). The lim
j!1
 (j) is equivalent
to the solution(s), if any, of such di¤erence equation given  0 as initial condi-
tion. Let us denote with  ^j the value of  j such that

dm[ j ]
d j

 j= ^j
= 1. We
yield respectively zero, one or two xed points as solution of the di¤erence
equation i¤m
h
 ^j
i
R ^j .  ^j is then equal to:
 ^j =
1


R

 1
1 
  1  

(15A)
Note thatR >  in all the parametersspace. Such condition guarantees
the existence of at least one stable xed point. For analytical tractability
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we determine the solutions for quadratic form case. For  = 12 under the
above condition the two xed points are:
 1;2 =
1


2R


R
p
R2   

  1

We focus on the stable equilibrium, denoted by   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

and we take  0 =   as initial condition. The solution of the di¤erence equa-
tion (13A) is represented in Figure 2:5.
Figure 2:5:  (j+1)=m[ (j)]
Under the condition R > (1 + n) the lim
j!1
(j) <1 is equal to 1+nR (1+n) 
R. Consequently the lim
j!1
g(j) = lim
j!1
 
Pj
l=1
 
1+n
R
l
< 1 is equal to
R


2R


R pR2   

  1

: Under such convergence conditions the xed
points are nally attained. Rearranging the terms we can reformulate the
individual rational scal and redistribution policies as follows:
T [ht; kt] =  b3 kt
1 + ht
+ b2
ht
1 + ht
+ b1
1
1 + ht
+ b0 (16A)
where b0  
O; b1  h (1  ) (
A + (2+ R)
O) + R
O; b2   (
A +
2
O) and b3  R
A;
E [ht] = a1ht + a0 (17A)
where a0  1 1+nh  and a1  1+n :
For what concerns feasibility conditions of scal and redistributive poli-
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cies, the arguments reported in the proof of Proposition (1) continue to
hold. We denote with (Kt ;H

t ) = f(kt; ht) jkmt < kt < k^mt g where k^mt 
b2+b0
b3
ht +
b1+b0
b3
and kmt (ht)  b2+b0 1b3 ht + b1+b0 1b3 . While
Het =
(
fhtjht 2 (0;1)g
fhtjht 2 (~h;1)g
if h < 1(1 ) 
if h  1(1 ) 
where ~h  1 h(1 )   1 . Jointly considering the above feasibility conditions
for both scal and redistributive dimensions, non-degenerate policies, i.e.
t 2 (0; 1) and et 2

0; k^t

, are achieved at each time for any (kt; ht) 2
(Kt ;H

t ) \Het :
Second step
We now check for the second order conditions in order to get proper
solutions. At each time the FOC can be rewritten as follows:
W : (1 + n)((1 + ht)vC2;t + (
1 + n
R
(1 + ht+1)
dt+1
dt
  (1 + ht))vC1;t)
We : (1 + n)
2( vC2;t +
1
R
(
dht+1
det
t+1 +
dt+1
det
(1 + ht+1)  (1 + n)det+1
det
)vC1;t)
where dt+1dt =
dt+1
dkt+1
dkt+1
dt
, det+1det =
det+1
dht+1
dht+1
det
and dt+1det =
dt+1
dkt+1
dkt+1
det
+
dt+1
dht+1
dht+1
det
:
Proof of Corollary (2). The proof is straightforward. The derivative of
Eq. (2.25) with respect to ht is equal to:
dt
dht
=
b3kt + b2   b1
(1 + ht)
2 (18A)
For any level of kt; if b1 6 b2, then dtdht > 0. Otherwise, if b1 > b2, then the
sign of Eq. (18A) depends on the value reached by kt. When kt < ~k where
~k  b1 b2b3 the income tax rate is a decreasing function of ht, i.e. dtdht < 0:
The opposite holds for kt > ~k:
Proof of Corollary (3). Given the balanced budget constraint (2.14),
let us denote with P [ht; kt]  (1 + n) (1 + ht) t [ht; kt]   (1 + n)2 e [ht] the
equilibrium pension policy rule. Under the decreasing return in education
and the equilibrium level of policy rules, Eq. (2.24) and Eq. (2.25), the
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total amount of pension contributions can be rewritten as follows:
pt+1 = P [ht+1; kt+1]  (19A)
(1 + n) [ b3kt+1 + (b2 + b0   (1 + n) a1)ht+1 + (b1 + b0   (1 + n) a0)]
The derivative of (19A) with respect to et is equal to:
dpt+1
det
= (1 + n)

 b3dkt+1
det
+ (b2 + b0   (1 + n) a1) dht+1
det

(20A)
where under log utility dkt+1det =  
(b2+b0 a1(1+n))
R(1+)
dht+1
det
. After some algebra,
the derivative (20A) is as follows:
dpt+1
det
=
R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b2 + b0   a1 (1 + n))
R (1 + )  b3
dht+1
det
(21A)
Noting that (b2 + b0   a1 (1 + n)) > 0 and R (1 + )   b3 > 0, Eq. (21A)
takes always positive values for any welfare state regime and in the whole
state space.
Proof of Corollary (4). Let us denote with  = b2+b0b1+b0 a measure of the
welfare state regimes intensity. According to Eq. (2.26), the higher the
adultsrelative power is, the larger is the value of : Normalizing the Eq.
(19A) by the factor (b1 + b0), we obtain:
pt = (1 + n)
h
 b3kt + (  (1 + n)a1)ht + (1  (1 + n)a0)
i
(22A)
where pt  ptb1+b0 ; b3  b3b1+b0 ; a0  a0b1+b0 and a1  a1b1+b0 . Taking the
derivatives of Eq. (22A) with respect to  and kt, the marginal impacts
dpt
d = (1 + n)ht > 0 and
dpt
dkt
=   (1 + n)b3 < 0 are attained. In other
words, the higher the level of  and the lower the level of physical capital
are, the larger is the amount of pension benets.
Proof of Corollary (5). The equilibrium education transfer chosen by
politicians is the linear policy rule E [ht] = a1ht+a0; with a1 and a0 dened
in Proposition 6: Political population aging, an increase in ; does not a¤ect
at all the amount of equilibrium forward transfers, then dEd = 0: The equi-
librium level of income tax rate is instead a linear function of kt and non
linear in ht; T [kt; ht] =  b3 kt1+ht+b2 ht1+ht+b1 11+ht+b0; where the coe¢ cients
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are fully described in Proposition 2. A variation in the exogenous political
ideological bias  determines the following marginal changes in the struc-
tural parameters: db3d =   R(1+n)(1+)(+(1+n)(1+))2 < 0;
db2
d =
 (1+n)(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0,
db1
d =
(1+n)(1+)(1+n+(1 ) hR)
(R (1+n))(+(1+n)(1+))2 > 0 and
db0
d =
(1+n)(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0. Then,
for any level of h dTd > 0, which implies positive correlation between the pen-
sion benets and the ideological bias in favor of old agents. Finally, using the
above results, the derivative of pensions transfers obtained by balanced bud-
get constraint, P [ht; kt] = (1 + n) ((1 + ht)T [ht; kt]   (1 + n)E [ht]), with
respect to the political aging parameter is dPd = (1 + n)

(1 + ht)
dT
d

> 0.
Proof of Corollary (6). To determine the e¤ect of demographic population
aging on the level of education transfers chosen by politicians, i.e. a decrease
in n; note that da1dn =   (1+n)2  < 0 and
da0
dn =   1 (1+n)2 h  < 0: Then it
follows dEdn < 0: Concerning the impact of n on the political equilibrium
level of income tax rate the following marginal changes in the structural
parameters hold: db3dn =
+R(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
> 0, db2dn =    
(1+)
(+(1+n)(1+))2
< 0;
db1
dn = D0 + D1D2 R 0; where D0  (R (1+n))(+(1+)(1+n)) > 0, D1 
(1+n+h (1 )R)
(R (1+n))(+(1+)(1+n)) > 0 and D2 

1
R (1+n)   1++(1+)(1+n)

= 11+n(
R 

A) R 0 if R R 
A, nally db0dn =   (1+)(+(1+n)(1+))2 < 0. Then it follows
that dTdn R 0 depending on the di¤erence
 
R  
A

and on the level of h:
In particular a su¢ cient condition to yield dTdn < 0 is
R < 
A and h high
enough. Finally the marginal variation of pension benets due to population
growth is equal to dPdn = (1 + n) ((1 + ht)
dT
dn   (1 + n) dEdn ) R 0:
Proof of Lemma (5). Let us rst consider the transition dynamics of ht
and et. Plugging the equilibrium education transfers, Eq. (2.24), into the
human capital production, Eq. (2.3), we obtain the law of motion ht+1 =
Hd [ht], which is equal to:
ht+1 = 1ht + 0 (23A)
where 0  (1 )h1+n
p
  and 1  1+n
p
 . It should be noted the serial
correlation between current and future level of human capital is always pos-
itive, i.e. 1 > 0; To determine the law of motion of the redistributive policy
we plug Eq. (2.3) into the equilibrium education policy rule at time t + 1:
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The law of motion et+1 = Ed [ht] is then as follows:
et+1 = 1ht + 0 (24A)
where 0  a0

a1p
  + 1

and 1  a
2
1p
  : Note that, if the dynamics of ht
is characterized by stable convergence, i.e. 1 < 1, then also the dynamics
of et is convergent toward the steady state. Thus, using the expression of
1, the su¢ cient condition for the convergence stability of both ht and et
requires:
n > n (25A)
where n 
r
2R

R pR2   

     1: Due to linearity, both ht and et
converge monotonically toward the steady states.
Let us now analyze the transition dynamics of kt and t. First, con-
sider the following recursive formulation for the equilibrium saving under
log-utility, kt+1 = ~K [et; t; ht], which is obtained plugging the human cap-
ital production, Eq. (2.3), and the expected equilibrium policies et+1 and
t+1 according to Eq. (2.24) and (2.25). The saving function can then be
rewritten as follows:
kt+1=
R (1 + ht) (1   t)
(R (1 + ) b3) (1 + n) 
(b0+b2  (1 + n) a1)H [et; ht]
R (1 + ) b3 +
(b0+b1  (1 + n) a0)
R (1 + ) b3
(26A)
Plugging the equilibrium policy rules, Eq. (2.24) and Eq. (2.25), into Eq.
(26A), we obtain the law of motion kt+1 = Kd [ht; kt]:
kt+1 = 2kt + 1ht + 0 (27A)
where:
2 Rb3
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)
1 

(b0+b2 a1 (1 + n))1
(R (1 + ) b3) +
R (b0+b2 1)
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)

0 

b0+b1 a0 (1 + n)
(R (1 + ) b3) +
(b0+b2 a1 (1 + n))0
(R (1 + ) b3) +
R (b0+b1 1)
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) b3)

It should be noted that current and future level of physical capital are pos-
itively interrelated each other, 2 > 0, on the contrary the way ht perturbs
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kt+1 depends on the welfare state regimesintensity embedded in the para-
meter 1.
Under condition (25A), the dynamics of physical capital is characterized
by stable convergence if 2 < 1, which requires:
 >  (28A)
where    (R  (1 + n)). Let us denote by Qht  1+ht1+ht+1 . Plugging Eq.
(23A) and (26A) into the equilibrium income tax policy at time t + 1, af-
ter some manipulations, we attain the law of motion t+1 = Td [t; ht], as
follows:
t+1 =  [ht] t +  [ht] (29A)
where:
 [ht] Rb3
(1 + n) (R (1 + )  b3)Q
h
t
 [ht]R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b1 b2)+ (1 + n)
2 (a1 a0) b3
(R (1 + )  b3) (1 + n)
1
1 + 1ht+0
  Rb3
(R (1 + )  b3) (1 + n)
1 + ht
1 + 1ht+0
+
R (1 + ) (b0+b2)  (1 + n) b3a1
R (1 + ) b3
Note that, under Eq. (25A), the convergence condition for kt, Eq. (28A),
is also su¢ cient for the convergence of t, i.e.  [h] < 1. Furthermore the
speed of convergence for t basically depends on the welfare state regime
characterizing the economy jointly with the exogenous human capital society
endowment. To show how such elements may a¤ect the type of convergence
let us take the derivative of   [ht] with respect to the human capital asset.
We obtain:
d [ht]
dht
=
 b3

R (1+0   1)+ (1 + n)2  (a1 a0)

(1 + n) (R (1 + )  b3) (1 + 1ht+0)2
  R (1 + ) (1 + n) (b1 b2)1
(1 + n) (R (1 + )  b3) (1 + 1ht+0)2
It is straightforward to show how the sign of d[ht]dht crucially depends on the
di¤erences (a1 a0) and (b1 b2) and in nal instance on the level of social
culture, h, and on the relative political power weights of adults and old
embedded in the coe¢ cients b1 and b2:When
d[ht]
dht
R

S

0 and 0 S
 
R


then the speed of convergence toward the steady state is lower (higher) than
in the opposite case.
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From a qualitative point of view the dynamics of et and t are mirror
image respectively to the dynamics of ht and kt: They mainly di¤er from an
autoregressive component of innite order in the past level of public educa-
tion, which arises because of the innite persistence of education spending
on the future level of human capital through the parental transmission.
Figure 2:6: Panel (a) shows the law of motion of et; Panel (b) shows the law of motion of t:
The Figure 2:6 emphasizes the dynamics of the political variables. The
Panel (a) shows that, once the human capital converges to the steady state
also the education policy reaches its balanced growth path. Di¤erently, the
Panel (b) highlights how the convergence condition of ht is necessary but
not su¢ cient for the stable convergence of the scal policy rule, which also
requires the dynamic stability of kt.
Proof of Proposition (7). Under Lemma 3, due to linearity of the laws
of motion, Eq. (23A) ; (24A) ; (27A) and (29A), there exists a unique steady
state fe; ; h; kg. Equating ht+1 = ht = h in Eq. (23A) and kt+1 =
kt = k
 in Eq. (27A) ; the following steady state levels for the state variables
are obtained:
h =
(1  ) hp 
(1 + n)  p  (30A)
k=
R (b0+b2 1)+ (1 + n) (b0+b2  (1 + n) a1)1
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n) h
 (31A)
+
((1 + n) (1 + 0)+R) b0+((1 + n)+R) b1+(1 + n) b20  (1 + n)2 (a10+a0) R
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
Plugging Eq. (30A) and (31A) into the equilibrium policy rules described
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in Proposition 6, we obtain the following the steady states levels for the
political control variables:
e =
(1  ) h 
(1 + n)  p  (32A)
= (1 + n) (R (1 + ) (b1 b2)+ (1 + n) (a1 a0) b3)
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
1
1 + h
(33A)
+
Rb3
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n) 
(1 + n) (R (1 + ) (b0+b2)  (1 + n) b3a1)
b3 ((1 + n)+R) R (1 + ) (1 + n)
By balanced budget constraint the pension steady state level is:
p = (1 + n) (1 + h)    (1 + n)2 e
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Chapter 3
Time Consistent Optimal
Public Expenditures with
Intergenerational Exchange
3.1 Introduction
Long-lasting governments cannot always implement public policies under
full commitment. Starting from the seminal work by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) the issue has become a subject of increasing interest for economists in
general and policymakers in particular. To this point, the literature on time
consistent scal policies has conned itself to simple environments where
taxes are used to nance a ow of public goods or services that are rapidly ex-
hausted. In contrast, the benets of government spending have been mainly
documented for durable public goods that can be accumulated over time.
This fact is ignored in recent studies because introducing public goods which
are not rapidly depletable means introducing in the analyses an additional
state variable, which signicantly complicates the characterization of the
optimal discretionary policy.
This paper, therefore, focuses on that part of public expenditures con-
cerning intergenerational exchange, which is typically characterized by the
provision of public goof with both long- and short-lasting impact. In this
context the problem of understanding how the absence of government com-
mitment a¤ects the provision of public expenditure becomes crucial, as well
92 Chapter 3
as the implied welfare e¤ects over an economys transition to its long-run
equilibrium.
Among previous works on optimal public investment, Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1994, 1997), characterize the optimal policy under full commitment
only. More recent papers analyze optimal scal policy in the absence of com-
mitment, but in environments where public goods cannot be accumulated.
Klein et al. (2008) analyze the trade o¤ between providing a consumable
public good and its nancing, Hassler et al. (2005) study time-consistent
redistribution under repeated voting, and Azzimonti et al. (2006) explore
the distortionary e¤ects of income taxes on the evolution of wealth inequal-
ity. In contrast to these papers, our analysis focuses on the provision of a
durable public good (i.e. education) that expands the production frontier.
More closely to our theoretic environment Azzimonti et al. (2009) charac-
terize Markov-perfect equilibria in a setting where the absence of govern-
ment commitment a¤ects public investment in physical capital in terms of
infrastructure.
Related to these papers, solving for di¤erentiable Subgame Markov Per-
fect Equilibrium (SMPE), the contribution on public expenditure of our
work is threefold: (i) to illustrate how intergenerational exchange can a¤ect
macroeconomic outcomes through endogenous policy making in a normative
perspective; (ii) to characterize recursively, using functional-equation meth-
ods, time-consistent equilibria in the presence of non-depletable public goods
and human capital accumulation; (iii) to determine closed form solutions for
a specic economic environment and perform comparative statics with the
positive predictions attained under political competition (see Ch. 2).
In our environment heterogeneity is explicitly taken into account and it
concerns age as well as production factorsownership. In particular there
are two classes: adults/workers who receive the return from human capital
and old/capitalists who receive physical capital returns. In order to empha-
size the intergenerational conicts due to economic interests and the inter-
generational exchange which will result with the implementation of public
expenditures, the setup is characterized by a linear technology which uses
human capital and physical capital as perfect substitutes. Proportional in-
come taxation is used to simultaneously fund both transfers going lump-
sum to capitalists as pork-barrel and transfers going in a productive way
after one-period human capital accumulation to workers as public educa-
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tion investments. Saving decisions, made when adult, are a¤ected both by
productive transfers (positively) and by expected pork-barrel transfers (neg-
atively). Long-run persistency of the productive impact coming from pub-
lic good provision is guaranteed by the parental transmission of knowledge
across dynasties. Furthermore because of xed prices income/substitution
e¤ects are not perfectly compensated. Consequently di¤erent welfare state
regimes emerge depending on the relative weights assigned to each cohort
by the Central Planner and time-consistency is not generally guaranteed in
the absence of commitment devises.
The latter point becomes a relevant part of our analysis, which concerns
the discussion about the sequential nature of the Central Planner decision
making: the current government only sets current policies, without direct
inuence on the decisions of future governments. This lack of commitment
is a binding restriction in general and can be viewed as follows: each future
government takes its initial capital stock as inelastically supplied, whereas
the current government sees it as elastically supplied. Di¤erently from pre-
vious analyses we do not only obtain a rst order characterization (GEEs)
in the case in which the commitment constraint turns out to be binding,
stressing the divergence with respect to the rst best allocation, but we also
completely characterize the closed form solution for a specic case of interest
in which intergenerational exchanges have long-lasting impact. Comparing
the optimal predictions with the positive one obtained under probabilis-
tic voting competition, presented in Ch. 2 -, we nd that the equilibrium
allocation is education e¢ cient but, due to political overrepresentation of
elderly agents, the electoral competition process induces overtaxation com-
pared with a time-consistent Central Planner solution with balanced welfare
weights.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3:2 we present the un-
derlying economic environment. Section 3 characterizes the Pareto optimal
allocation with full commitment and no distortionary taxation. In section
3:4 the rst-order characterization of a time-consistent Central Planner is
provided and the distortions with respect to the rst best allocation are dis-
cussed. In section 3:5 we use the Generalized Euler Conditions derived in the
previous section as a base for analytical computation in the case of a simple
economy. Section 3:6 compares the normative predictions of the model with
the positive results attained under probabilistic voting competition. Section
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3:7 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
In this section we describe the specic setup. We then dene a benchmark
solution to an optimal-policy problem where the government can commit to
future policies and taxation is not distortionary (rst best allocation). After
that, we proceed toward a denition of a time consistent equilibrium where
the government does not have the ability to commit.
3.2.1 Economic Environment
Consider a discrete-time OLG economy populated by an innite number of
homogenous agents, living up to three-periods: youth, adulthood and old
age. Agents in the same class are identical. The population growth rate is
exogenous and equal to n 2 ( 1; 1), thus the mass of a generation born at
time j and living at time t is equal to N jt = N0 (1 + n)
t. The instantaneous
preferences of a representative agent born at time t  1 are then dened as
follows:
Ut 1[ct] = u[c1;t] + u[c2;t+1] (3.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the individual discount rate and u [] is twice continuously
di¤erentiable, with uc > 0, ucc < 0, and the usual Inada conditions hold.
When young, the agent spends all his time endowment in acquiring skills
if education is publicly provided without having access to private credit
markets and does not consume. When adult, the individual works, makes
saving choices, s1;t, and contributes to public spending through proportional
labor income taxes, t, while when old only consumes his entire income which
is composed by both capitalized private savings and pork-barrel transfers,
pt. The individual budget constraints are as follows:
c1;t  wt (1  t)  st (3.2)
c2;t+1  Rt+1st + pt+1 (3.3)
At each time a single consumption good is produced using a linear
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technology, in which human and physical capital are perfect substitute,
Yt = wtHt+RKt. Here the interest rate is treated as constant as in a small
open economy. Physical capital fully depreciates, i.e. (1 + n)kt+1 = st.
At any time t, each adult supplies inelatically one unit of labor with pro-
ductivity equal to ! augmented by the level of human capital acquired the
period before, ht. Without loss of generality, ! is normalized to unity. Hu-
man capital is produced according to a CRS technology which uses parental
education and public investment in education, et, as complement factors,
ht+1 = H(ht; et), such that H(ht; 0) = N t 1t , Hht > 0, Het > 0, Hhtet > 0
and Hetet  0.
3.3 The Pareto Optimal Allocation
Before describing the optimal outcome in the Central Planner case without
commitment,1 it is useful to characterize the e¢ cient allocation chosen by
a benevolent planner with a commitment technology and in the absence
of distortionary taxation. Among other public expenditures we focus on
intergenerational transfers by distinguishing between productive transfers
that go forward in time in terms of education investment, et, and pork-barrel
transfers that go backward to sustain old agents consumption, pt. We can
think about the latter in terms of PAYG transfers. The planner takes the
initial level of human and physical capital as given, and chooses the sequence
of policies fet; pt; c1;t; c2;t; ht+1; kt+1g1t=0 that maximizes the weighted sum
of utilities, where the Welfare weight of each representative dynasty is given
by . Lump sum taxation is used to nance public education and pension
contributions. The corresponding maximization problem becomes as follows:
max
fet;pt;c1;t;c2;t;ht+1;kt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t t (u[c1;t] + u[c2;t+1]) (3.4)
under linear production and CRS human capital technology and the follow-
ing aggregate resource constraint:
1 In this scenario the government cannot credible promise to abide by a sequence of
future tax rates to nance public transfers. Hence, setting taxes once and for all at
time zero results in policy announcements that are not credible, since, in each subsequent
period, policymakers take the states they inherit as given and do not account for the
impact of distortionary taxes on previous investment decisions.
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c1;tN
t 1
t + c2;tN
t 2
t + (1 + n) kt+1N
t 1
t + etN
t
t = Yt (3.5)
where both the forward transfers, et, and the backward transfers, pt, are
sustained by adults, as an opportunity cost in terms of private consumption.2
Since the policies at time t+ 1 inuence individual saving choices in period
t, the reoptimization in any period s > t would yield a rst order condition
violating the one achieved at time t. As long as the planner gives positive
weights to both the adult and old cohorts, the following Euler conditions for
the optimal allocation of education and pension transfers must be satised:3
uc1;t = Hetuc1;t+1 (3.6)
uc1;t = uc2;t (3.7)
The rst condition reects the direct e¤ect of et on the utility of the
adults in terms of current cost and expected benets. The second condi-
tion captures the current wedge between adults and old about the pension
system. The optimal investment choice satises:
uc1;t = Ruc2;t+1 (3.8)
Hence, the planner chooses kt+1 to equate the marginal cost in terms of
foregone consumption to the discounted marginal benets of savings.
Note that in the absence of lump sum taxation a distortion emerges that
creates a wedge, or gap, in the above conditions. Furthermore, to the degree
that policies other than lump sum taxes are used, such policies will generally
be time inconsistent. In general, we dene rst best gaps or wedges in the
public expenditure as:
fbe  uc1;t   Hetuc1;t+1 (3.9)
fbp  uc1;t   uc2;t (3.10)
Similarly, we dene a rst best wedge in the e¢ cient private investment
2We will characterized steady-state Pareto allocations in the Technical Appendix.
3We use uc1t to indicate uc (ct), Het to indicate He (et; Ht), etc. to simplify notation
when the context is clear.
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decision as:
fbk0  uc1;t   Ruc2;t+1 (3.11)
where fbk0 = 0 under rst best allocations.
3.4 Central Planner Equilibriumwithout Commit-
ment
We now move toward the denition of Markov Equilibrium for Central Plan-
ner (CP) without commitment. A benevolent government can implement
distortionary taxation and intergenerational exchange through a system of
public transfers nanced by proportional income taxation, subject to the
following balanced budget condition:
N t 1t (1 + ht) t = N
t
t et +N
t 2
t pt (3.12)
In the previous chapter we proved the existence of a time consistent
bidimensional scal plan in the case of electoral competition and repeated
voting. The SMPE was also characterized in closed form as a nite-horizon
equilibrium, whose limit when time goes to innity is well-dened. We now
implement the CP optimal allocation under a zero-cost enforceability con-
straint and we use it as a normative benchmark to make policy predictions.
The induction procedure adopted for the resolution of the Markov perfect
political problem su¤ers of "end of horizon" e¤ects for the determination of
education transfers. Due to the one-period lagged impact of education in-
vestments in human capital production, the equilibrium education transfer
appears degenerative in the last period of a nite horizon economy. As a
consequence the limit of the nite horizon game does not coincide with the
di¤erentiable SMPE of the corresponding innite-horizon economy.4 Thus
the CP solution requires an innite dimensional strategies space and turns
out to be quantitatively di¤erent from the political equilibrium.
As in the political game, we exclude private agentsdefault on the im-
plemented scal plan within the period. Furthermore, under a balanced
4See Fundeberg and Levine (1986) for the characterization of the necessary and suf-
cient condition for equilibria of a game to arise as limits of "-equilibria of games with
smaller strategy spaces (for example nite horizon).
98 Chapter 3
budget constraint the government platform is characterized by the vector
f ct  (ect ;  ct ) ; where the apex c stands for CP. Given the initial conditions
(h0; k0), we rst dene the CP optimization program in a sequential version.
Let us denote the equilibrium ex-ante instantaneous consumption behavior
respectively for adults and old living at time t:
C1;t [
c
t ; ht; kt+1]  (1 + ht) (1   ct ) + (1 + n) kt+1 (3.13)
C2;t [f
c
t ; ht; kt]  (1 + n)Rkt + pct (3.14)
Thus the sequential version of the CP maximization program turns out
to be equal to:
max
ffct g1t=0
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1] (3.15)
subject to the following constraints:
c [ht; kt] =
(
kt+1 = K

f ct ; f
c
t+1; ht

ht+1 = H [et; ht]
(3.16)
where B [] is a concave function dened as:
B [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1]  u [C2;t [f ct ; ht; kt]] + (1 + n) u [C1;t [ ct ; ht; kt+1]]
K [] is the function which fully describes private saving behavior, which
under concave separable additive preferences depends both on current and
future expected policies. H [] is the adopted human capital technology,
which depends on both parental human capital and public investments in
education, exploiting complementarity e¤ects.
The CP assigns a Welfare weight  to each dynasty. Let us consider the
restriction  <   11+n ; which induces weak deterrence power, justifying
the implementation of an optimal scal plan without imposing commitment
devices.
Remark 13 In the innite-horizon CP environment the agents Welfare
weight distribution is represented by the following innite-dimensional vec-
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tor:
=c(1)

;  (1 + n) ;  (1 + n) ; 2 (1 + n)2 ; :::; j (1 + n)j ; j+1 (1 + n)j+1 ; :::

2 R1
(3.17)
Then the resulting relative Welfare weights are:

cR
 (1 + n) (1 + )
 + (1 + n)
and 
cO
 (1   (1 + n))
 +  (1 + n)
(3.18)
In the innite-horizon game the CP takes into account both the relative
Welfare weight of the representative agent, 
cR; and the olds bargaining
power gap between current and future pensioners, 
cO.
Remark 14 The more population ages (i.e. n decreases), the smaller is the
relative Welfare weight of the representative agent (
cR), the larger is the
olds bargaining power gap (
cO) :
Clearly, the sequential optimization dynamic program (3.15) features
similar dynamic inconsistency problems as in the political game. Without
having access to a commitment mechanism, the government cannot choose
future taxes and transfers directly, but it still wants to maximize her objec-
tive function, and it still needs to select an allocation among decentralized
equilibria. In order to get time-consistent policy equilibrium, the current
government should set the current policy perfectly foreseeing how the fu-
ture governments will set intergenerational transfers. The key insight here
is that the policies set in any period will depend on the relevant stocks
the economy is endowed with at the beginning of the period, i.e. physical
and human capital. In other terms we are looking for a multidimensional
government policy that obeys a recursive rule given by the function:
f ct = zc [kt; ht] (3.19)
where zc [] is the key endogenous variable, which we restrict to be di¤eren-
tiable.
As in Klein at al. (2008),5 let us rewrite in a recursive way the sequential
CP program in order to derive the government Generalized Euler Equations
5Unlike Klein et al. (2008), however, and more generally models with a single state vari-
able, the derivation of the GEEs, which characterizes the solution, is substantially more
involved with two states. We show that such a deviation remains analytically tractable in
our economy.
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(GEEs), which capture the CP optimal trade-o¤s between taxation and
redistribution wedges over time.6 Due to stationarity, we will omit the
time subscript, denoting by the prime symbol next-period values.7 In order
to specify the CPs problem, we need its key inputs: a view of how the
private sector responds to its current scal choices. The specication of this
response must include what will happen in the future in response to the
current scal choices. Let us denote with  [f c; f c0h; h0; k0] the economic rst
order condition coming from utility maximization and the equilibrium saving
choices by private agents, such that  [f c; f c0h; h0; k0] = 0. In equilibrium,
by the implicit function theorem, there exists a unique k0 = K [f c; f c0h; h0]
satisfying  [f c; f c0h; h0;K []] = 0. If there exists a policy rule zc [h; k] which
solves the CP optimization program, then under the transformation function
of human capital, h0 = H(ec; h), we derive the recursive formulation of K [],
whose functional form is then equal to k0 = ~K [f c; h]. The recursive economic
rst order condition becomes 
h
f c; h; ~K [f c; h]
i
= 0. Derivating the function
 [] with respect to its arguments we obtain ~Kfc =  

fc
k0
and ~Kh =   hk0 :
After some manipulations, Eq. (3.15) can be reformulated in terms of a
Bellman equation, as follows:8
V c [h; k] = max
ffc;h0;k0g
B

f c; h; k; k0

+ (1 + n) V c

h0; k0

(3.20)
We now provide the formal denition of the time-consistent CP equilib-
rium policy decision rules as solution of a dynamic programming equation:
Denition 7 An innite-horizon SMPE of the CP problem is dened as
a vector of di¤erentiable policy decision rules, zc = (Tc;Ec), where Tc :
R  R  ! (0; 1) and Ec : R  R  ! (0; e^t) are the taxation policy rule
and the public higher education policy rule,  c = Tc [h; k] and ec = Ec [h; k],
respectively. Given the Bellman Eq. (3.20), the following conditions must
hold:
6The GEE is the FOC of the government maximization program. It is obtained
deriving the Bellman equation with respect to the political control variables, fc. GEE
can be equivalently derived by using Bellmans principle to identify Markov equilibrium
with the solution of the sequential version of the central planner program. The Euler
equation of this sequential problem is exactly the GEE.
7The stationarity requirement allows us to focus only on the current level of asset
stocks, ruling out explicit dependence on any history beyond.
8See Appendix B for the derivation of both Bellman equation and GEEs.
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(i)
zc [h; k] = argmax
fc
B

f c; h; k; k0

+ (1 + n) V c

h0; k0

(3.21)
subject to the following set of constraints:
1) V c [zc [] ; h; k]  V c;LF [h; k]
2) c [h; k] =
(
k0 = ~K [f c; h]
h0 = H [ec; h]
3) f c 2 c [h; k]
(3.22)
(ii)
V c [h; k] =M (V c) [h; k] (3.23)
where the functional form M : C1
 
R2
! C1  R2 is dened as follows:
M (V c) [h; k] := max
fc2c[h;k]
B
h
f c; h; k; ~K []
i
+ (1 + n) V c
h
H [] ; ~K []
i
(3.24)
The rst condition requires that the political variables, f c, have to be
chosen by CP in order to maximize the utilitaristic social welfare, internal-
izing the equilibrium private saving decision and all the direct and indirect
feedback e¤ects. The second requirement is the xed point condition, given
the mapping M (V c).
3.4.1 First order characterization: GEEs
In section 3:3 we saw how in the presence of lump sum taxes, the government
would set all distortions to zero, attaining rst-best allocations. In contrast,
in our setting, distortionary taxes and long-lasting intergenerational trans-
fers induce wedges in the intertemporal conditions describing the e¢ cient
provision of public transfers and private capital, Eq. (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11).
The following proposition states that the optimal discretionary policy is such
that it sets a linear weighted sum of these distortions to zero.
Proposition 8 Let 1  (1 + h0)

H0
h0
H0
e0
0
e0
0
 0
  
0
h0
0
 0

and 2  1+(1+n)H
0
h0
H0
e0
.
Then, in terms of wedges, the GEEs of the sequential CP program with
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respect of e and  are as follows:
0 = e + 
e
k0
k0 + He ~
0
e (3.25)
0 = (1 + h) + (1 + n)

k0
k0 (3.26)
where we denote by  the following intra-/inter-temporal wedges:9
  uC2   uC1 taxation wedge
~e   1uC1 + 2uC2 "persistency" scal wedge
h  uC2 +  (1  )uC1 human capital endowment wedge
e   uC2 + He0h0 forward redistribution wedge
k0  uC1   RuC02 savings/consumption wedge
Proof. (See Appendix)
The GEEs in terms of a weighted sum of deviations from e¢ cient in-
tertemporal decisions even if somewhat cumbersome in terms of computa-
tion, give meaningful economic insights. Under a di¤erentiability condition
of policy rules we are able to provide a non-trivial formulation of the gov-
ernment rst order condition in the case of no commitment. The above
inter- and intra-temporal wedges can be interpreted as deviations from the
e¢ cient intertemporal decisions and they acquire straightforward economic
meaning in the recursive dynamic environment. First, note that only the
current and the subsequent period matter directly. Even though both the
current tax rate and the public education investment choices have repercus-
sions into the innite future, the marginal costs and benets in equilibrium
can be summarized by terms involving only two consecutive periods. As a
consequence, the GEE can also be viewed as resulting from a variational
(two-periods) problem (Klein et al., 2008).10 Recalling that the SMPE in
9The strategic wedges  ; e;h and k0 are derived as the marginal direct im-
pact on the intertemporal agents utility respectively of a variation in taxation, ed-
ucation investments, human capital endowment and individual savings. For exam-
ple, a marginal variation in the income tax rate determines a direct cost for cur-
rent adults equal to  (1 + n) (1 + h)uc1 and a direct benets for current old equal
to  (1 + n) (1 + h)uc2 : The intergenerational taxation wedge becomes then  
 (1 + n) (1 + h)uc2    (1 + n) (1 + h)uc1 which normalized by (1 + n) (1 + h) is equal
to   uc2   uc1 : The same characterization hold for e;h and k0 .
10Think of our variational problem as follows: given the state variables (h; k) and
(h00; k00) xed, let us vary (h0; k0) through the controls (;  0) and (e; e0), in order to obtain
the highest possible utility.
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the political case has been obtained as the limit of a nite horizon economy,
whose convergence has been attained after two periods, we may easily con-
jecture no structural di¤erences between the two equilibrium policy rules.
For this reason in the following paragraph we will use the guess of the po-
litical equilibrium to verify the GEE and obtain the CP solution without
commitment.
Let us discuss in more details the main economic and technical implica-
tions coming from the rst order necessary conditions of the Central Planner
maximization problem.
3.4.2 How far from the Pareto optimal frontier?
Our analysis indicates that by implementing Markov-perfect strategies can
lead to considerably di¤erent allocations in the long run with respect to
the Pareto optimal allocation, moving from an economy with government
commitment to one with discretion. This outcome basically arises because
of the greater emphasis that Markov governments place on short-run gains
relative to a Ramsey planner. In particular, although the economy with com-
mitment achieves higher long-run consumption relative to the regime with
discretion, the tax policy chosen under discretion implies higher consump-
tion in the early stages of the transition relative to the Ramsey equilibrium.
This e¤ect, therefore, partially o¤sets welfare losses incurred in the long run.
Before solving quantitatively the CP problem, let us interpret the GEE
rewritten in terms of a linear weighted combination of wedges. First con-
sider Eq. (3.26) : Due to a marginal increase in distortionary taxation,  ,
the ine¢ ciency of private savings emerges. Such ine¢ ciency is captured by
the intertemporal savings distortion, k0 , which is scaled by the reduction
in household savings, ~K =   k0 < 0. Furthermore an increase in the in-
come tax rate determines an increase in the gap between uC2 and uC1which
is captured by the intratemporal utility distortion,  : Note that, due to
full depreciation of physical capital k00 is equal to ~K (f 0; h0) and it is not
a function of k0: Then a variation in the current tax rate does not a¤ect
next periods wedges through its e¤ect on future levels of physical capital.
More cumbersome distortions emerge instead from the equilibrium deter-
mination of public education transfers, Eq. (3.25). As before an increase
in e makes private savings ine¢ ciency emerge, which is now scaled by the
variation in household savings, ~Ke =   ek0 < 0; which is negative due to the
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substitution e¤ects with public savings that are increased via the retributive
pension scheme. The second component, e, represents the intertemporal
utility distortion due to an increase in education transfers today, which de-
termines both a decrease in the utility of current old and simultaneously
an increase of the sum of the next-period adultsand olds weighted utility,
 0uC2+ (1   0)uC1 , since they benet from the augmented human capital
h0: Finally, di¤erently from ; a variation in the current level of education
transfers also a¤ects next periods wedges through its e¤ect on h0, which
induces a variation of both k00 and h00: More intuitively the last term of Eq.
(3.25) can be rewritten in the following terms:
He ~
0
e = He
 
B0 0
 
~K 0e0
~K 0 0
H 0h0
H 0e0
 
~K 0h0
~K 0 0
!
 B0e0
H 0h0
H 0e0
!
(3.27)
where the term  He H
0
h0
H0
e0
is equal to the variation of e0 which prevents h00 from
a variation, while the term He

~K0
e0
~K0
 0
H0
h0
H0
e0
  ~K
0
h0
~K0
 0

is equal to the variation of
 0 which prevents k00 from a variation induced by current investment in
education. In terms of wedges this variation in e determines an increase in
the gap between uC02 and uC01 , i.e.
~0e, which is a¤ected by the described
distortions.
3.5 A Closed Form Economy
We now use a parametric example to illustrate some of the results in our
model. Under the assumption of log-linear utility, u[c] = log [c], we solve the
CP optimization problem by guessing a time consistent bidimensional policy
structurally equivalent to Eq. (2.24) and (2.25) in Ch. 3, which veries the
conditions (3.25) and (3.26). Fixing  = 12 ; let 
c   Kc ;Hc \ Hec be
the state-space in which interior policy rules are obtained. Then the next
Proposition characterizes the optimal feasible time-consistent policy rules:
Proposition 9 Under the dynamic e¢ ciency condition, for any (h; k) 2 c
the set of feasible rational policies, f c  (ec;  c) ; which can be supported by
a CP SMPE with perfect foresights, has the following functional form:
(i)
Ec [h] = ac1h+ a
c
0 (3.28)
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where ac1 = a1 and a
c
0 = a0;
(ii)
Tc [h; k] =  bc3
k
1 + h
+ bc2
h
1 + h
+ bc1
1
1 + h
+ bc0 (3.29)
where bc0  
cO, bc1  h1  RR (1+n)bc2 + R(
cO   h (1  ) ), bc2 

p
 
R p  (

c
O +R
p
 
cR    ) and bc3  R
cR.
For any (h; k) =2 c corner solutions result in at least one of the two
dimensions.
Proof. (See Appendix).
Specically, in equilibrium both the CP and the o¢ ce-seeking politicians
in a probabilistic voting environment set the same amount of forward trans-
fers, inducing education-e¢ cient political scal plans, as already discussed
in Paragraph 2:4:1; i.e. Ec [h] = E [h] for any level of human capital. The
main di¤erence concerns their quantitative predictions on the taxation pol-
icy dimension, which are fully captured by the policy parameters. As already
noted such divergence comes from the fact that the nite horizon equilib-
rium is not epsilon-perfect according to Fudenberg and Levine (1986). In
the following paragraph we discuss in details the divergence of the political
equilibrium from the CP optimal allocation.
3.6 Are the political choices on pensions and ed-
ucation optimal?
Both the politicians and the social planner have incentives to provide inter-
generational transfers in an environment with a linear technology with hu-
man capital accumulation and log-linear preferences. Moreover, their time-
consistent equilibrium policies share similar structural properties.11 How-
ever the quantitative di¤erences detected so far imply distinct predictions
in terms of regimesidentication and political behavior. For this reason we
now examine how politicians act relatively to the CP in terms of taxation
design. In other words, we determine to what extent the interior political
SMPE chosen by the politicians diverges from the equilibrium policy rules
11To make comparison let us refer to the politico-economic equilibrium under perfect
foresight of Ch. 2.
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achieved by the CP without commitment. In order to obtain clear predic-
tions, we normalize the vector of Welfare weights by  assigning    .
Consequently we are able to write the relative Welfare weights, Eq. (3.18),
in terms of political weights, making the two solutions comparable.12 Let us
introduce the following denitions   (; n) 2  ;1 (n; n) j b2 > b1	
and c  (; n) 2  ;1 (n; n) j bc2 > bc1	 : In other terms (;c) delim-
its the parametric space in which PCR emerges respectively for the political
and the CP cases. The following Corollary resumes the conditions for the
Welfare regimescomparison between the political and CP cases in the para-
metric space (; n).
Corollary 7 For any level of h and n 2 (n; n) the following   c holds
Proof. (See Appendix).
The parametric space in which PCR emerges is always larger in the CP
environment than in the political one. Furthermore let  be a su¢ ciently
large value of the ideological bias,13 such that for any  < , the following
Proposition is stated.
Proposition 10 Under dynamic e¢ ciency, for any  <  and for any
 < , the political SMPE induces overtaxation with respect to the time-
consistent Central Planner SMPE, i.e. T [ht; kt] > Tc [ht; kt] for any (ht; kt) 2
p \c.
Proof. (See Appendix).
According to the above proposition, if the CP adopts a politically equiv-
alent system of welfare weights, for any level of human and physical capital
the level of the income tax rate is always lower than in the political case,
i.e. T [ht; kt] > Tc [ht; kt]. Then, the politicians involved in a Markov game
among successive generations of players deliver the time consistent social
optimum if they reduce the political weight they assign to the old agents.
Given the invariant level of education transfers achieved by both the politi-
cians and the social planner, a high tax rate implies too generous pension
12 In particular the relative Welfare weights rewritten in terms of political weights are
equal to:

cR  (1 + n) (1 + )
+ (1 + n)
and 
cO    (1 + n)
+(1 + n)
13See proof of Proposition 5 for the exact determination of :
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benets. These distortions come from the politicians strategic behavior.
In determining taxation rules, short-lived politicians take into account that
future politicians will compensate the scal cost of current adults by pay-
ing pensions in their old age. This stems from the fact that higher taxes
today lead to lower private wealth in old age, i.e. to a lower state variable
in the following period, thereby triggering more transfers from the future
politicians. The policy response of the future politicians thus reduces the
current (electoral) cost of transferring resources to the elderly and leads to
overspending, unless the adults enjoy an unusually large political power.
Consequently, by transferring too much resources to old age due to both the
overrepresentation of the current elderly agents and the policy response of
future politicians, the politicians fail to provide the optimal income tax rate
policy.
3.7 Conclusions
We characterize Markov-perfect equilibria in a model in which the absence
of government commitment a¤ects public expenditures in intergenerational
transfers. Through the GEEs of the Central Planners maximization prob-
lem we show that in choosing the tax rate and the type of redistribution,
the government trades o¤ intertemporal distortions in the provision of public
expenditures over two consecutive periods only.
In particular we nd closed form solution in a simple economy subject
to a binding time-consistency constraint and characterized by a linear tech-
nology, productive public expenditures and log-additive preferences. In our
environment intergenerational conicts especially arise because of produc-
tion factors ownership. The equilibrium turns out to be characterized by a
bidimensional time-varying policy rule non trivially related to the relevant
state variables of our economy.
Finally, due to the distortions generated by the repeated political com-
petition process and by the political overrepresentation of elderly agents,
political equilibrium under probabilistic voting is characterized by overtax-
ation compared with a time-consistent Central Planner solution.
Our analysis leaves some natural directions open for future research,
especially from a technical point of view. Closed form solutions in the dif-
ferentiable Markov strategiesgame will enable us to implement numerical
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methods, such as the Projection Method, to test the robustness of the algo-
rithm and the sensitivity of the model to structural variations.
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3.8 Technical Appendix
3.8.1 Derivation of recursive formulation and Generalized
Euler Equation
We derive the recursive formulation of the CP program starting from its
sequential version:
V c0 [h0; k0] = maxffct ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1] (1B)
where (h0; k0) are the initial conditions of the payo¤-relevant state variables
of the dynamic optimization program andB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1]  u [C2;t [f ct ; ht; kt]]+
(1 + n) u [C1;t [
c
t ; ht; kt+1]]. Equivalently we rewrite the above value func-
tion in the following terms:
V c0 [h0; k0] = maxffc0 ;k1g
B [f c0 ; h0; k0; k1] + maxffct ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=1
1X
t=1
(1 + n)t tB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1]
(2B)
= max
ffc0 ;k1g
B [f c0 ; h0; k0; k1] + (1 + n)  maxffct ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=1
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1]
By denition, we have:
V c1 [h1; k1] = maxffct ;ht+1;kt+1g1t=1
1X
t=0
(1 + n)t tB [f ct ; ht; kt; kt+1] (3B)
Due to stationarity condition the indirect utility function satises V c0 [] 
V c1 []  :::  V ct [] ::. We omit time indexes and denote by prime symbol
next period variables. Plugging Eq. (3B) into Eq. (2B) we yield the follow-
ing Bellman equation:
V c [h; k] = max
fc
B

f c; h; k; k0

+ (1 + n) V c

h0; k0

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subject to the following set of constraints:
1) c [h; k] =
(
k0 = ~K [f c; h]
h0 = H [ec; h]
2) f c 2 c [h; k]
which can be rewritten as follows:
V c [h; k] = max
fc2c[h;k]
B
h
f c; h; k; ~K [f c; h]
i
+ (1 + n) V c
h
H [ec; h] ; ~K [f c; h]
i
(4B)
The GEE are obtained as the rst order condition of the CP optimiza-
tion plan. The derivation below follows the method proposed by Klein et al.
(2008) extending to the OLG case with two political controls in bidimen-
sional state-space. In the following let us denote with Yx  @Y@x the partial
derivative of Y with respect to x; while dYdx denotes total derivative. Fur-
thermore, for simplicity of notation we will omit the apex c. The political
rst order conditions of Eq. (4B) with respect to f  (e; ) are equal to:
0 = Be +Bk0 ~Ke + (1 + n) 

Vh0He + Vk0 ~Ke

(5B)
0 = B +Bk0 ~K + (1 + n) Vk0 ~K (6B)
Using Benveniste-Scheinkman formula we obtain the following expres-
sion for Vh and Vk:
Vh = Bh +Bk0 ~Kh + (1 + n) 

Vh0Hh + Vk0 ~Kh

(7B)
Vk = Bk (8B)
From Eq. (5B) and (6B) we obtain the expression for Vh0 and Vk0 :
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Vh0 =
1
(1 + n) He
 
B ~Ke  Be ~K
~K
!
(9B)
Vk0 =  B +Bk
0 ~K
(1 + n)  ~K
(10B)
Plugging Eq. (9B) and (10B) into (7B) we get the nal expression for
Vh :
Vh = Bh +
B ~Ke  Be ~K
~K
Hh
He
 B
~Kh
~K
(11B)
Using stationarity condition and plugging Eq. (8B) and (11B) into (5B)
and (6B), we obtain the GEEs of the CP problem respectively for e and  :
0 = Be +Bk0 ~Ke + (1 + n) 
  
B0h0 +
B0 0 ~K
0
e0  B0e0 ~K 0 0
~K 0 0
H 0h0
H 0e0
 B0 0
~K 0h0
~K 0 0
!
He +B
0
k0
~Ke
!
(12B)
0 = B +
 
Bk0 + (1 + n) B
0
k0

~K (13B)
From denition of B[], we have:
Be = uC2C2;e =  (1 + n)2uC2
B = uC2C2; +  (1 + n)uC1C1; = (1 + n) (1 + h) (uC2   uC1)
Bh = uC2C2;h +  (1 + n)uC1C1;h = (1 + n) (uC2 +  (1  )uC1)
Bk = uC2C2;k = R (1 + n)uC2
Bk0 =  (1 + n)uC1C1;k0 =   (1 + n)2 uC1
Using the above partial derivatives and rewriting ~Kj where j 2 (f c; h)
in terms of  [], we get the GEEs as a weighted combination of intergener-
ational wedges:
0 = e + 
e
k0
k0 + He ~
0
 0 (14B)
0 = (1 + h) + (1 + n)

k0
k0 (15B)
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where  are dened as:
  uC2   uC1 taxation wedge
~   1uC1 + 2uC2 "modied" taxation wedge
h  uC2 +  (1  )uC1 human capital endowment wedge
e   uC2 + He0h0 forward redistribution wedge
k0  uC1   RuC02 savings/consumption wedge
where 1  (1 + h0)

H0
h0
0
e0 H0e00h0
H0
e0
0
 0

and 2  1 + (1 + n)H
0
h0
H0
e0
:
Proof of Proposition (9). Let us guess as equilibrium policy functions for
the time-consistent Central Planner solution the following functional form
respectively for e and  :
eg = ac1h+ a
c
0
h (16B)
 g = bc3
k
1 + h
+ bc2
h
1 + h
+ bc1
1
1 + h
+ bc0 (17B)
which are structurally equivalent to the equilibrium policy rules in the po-
litical case. If Eq. (16B) and (17B) are the equilibrium of the Central
Planner problem, then they must satisfy simultaneously the GEEs given
by conditions (12B) and (13B). Let us manipulate the GEEs, plugging the
expressions for each partial derivative. We obtain for  and e, respectively:
0 =  uC2 + 
0BBBB@

 0uC02 +  (1   0)uC01

+(1 + h0)

uC02   uC01
 ~K0
e0
~K0
 0
H0
h0
H0
e0
  ~K
0
h0
~K0
 0

+(1 + n)uC02
H0
h0
H0
e0
1CCCCAHe (18B)
0 = uC2   uC1 (19B)
Using the equation of H [], the following expressions result:
He =
h+ (1  )h
2(1 + n)h0
(20B)
H 0h0
H 0e0
=
e0
h0 + (1  )h (21B)
Under logarithmic utility and linear production function, we characterize the
following saving choice:Plugging the guess given by Eq. (16B) and (17B)
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into the saving function, we obtain the following recursive function for saving
choice:
k0 = ~K [e; ; h] =
R
(1 + n) (bc3 +R (1 + ))
(1 + h) (1  ) (23B)
  b
c
2 + b
c
0   (1 + n) ac1
bc3 +R (1 + )
s 
h+ (1  ) h e
1 + n
  b
c
1 + b
c
0   (1 + n) ac0h
bc3 +R (1 + )
Using Eq. (21B) and (23B) and simplifying, we get:
~K 0e0
~K 0 0
H 0h0
H 0e0
 
~K 0h0
~K 0 0
=
1   0
1 + h0
Finally rearranging all the terms, Eq. (18B) becomes as follows:
0 =  uC2 + 

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

uC02He (25B)
Using the political Euler condition uC2   uC1 = 0 and the economic one
uC1  RuC02 = 0, Eq. (25B) simplies to:
1 =

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

1
R
He (26B)
which is also equivalent to:
e =

1 + (1 + n)
e0
h0 + (1  )h

1
2R
2 h+ (1  )h
1 + n
(27B)
Let us now make a further assumption on the guess on e, considering the
following variant of Eq. (16B) :
eg = ac1 ( 
g)h+ ac0 ( 
g) h (28B)
such that ac1 ( 
g) = 1+n 
g and ac0 ( 
g) = 1 1+n 
g, i.e. we guess the policy
e as a linear convex combination between parental human capital h and
human capital society endowment h scaled by a constant which has to be
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determined,  g: Then Eq. (27B) can be rewritten as follows:
e =

1 + n
~ gh+
1  
1 + n
~ gh (29B)
where ~ g 

1 + (1 + n) e
0
h0+(1 )h

1
2R
2
. Plugging the guess of e given
by Eq. (28B) into the expression of ~ g and simplifying we get:
~ g = (1 +  g)2

1
2R
2
(30B)
By xed-point condition ~ g =  g which yield the following solutions:
 g1;2 =
1


2R


R
p
R2   

  1

Similar arguments as in Proof of Proposition 2 can be made. Then let
us consider the stable root   = 1

2R


R pR2   

  1

as feasible
solution. It immediately follows that:
ac1 =

1 + n
  and ac0 =
1  
1 + n
  (31B)
are the solutions for the guess on e which turns out to be equivalent to the
political outcome After plugging the guesses, Eq. (16B) and Eq. (17B), and
the recursive saving function, Eq. (23B), into Eq. (19B), the GEE for the
policy  is as follows:

1
(1 + n)Rk + (1 + n)(1 + h)   (1 + n)2eg = 
1
(1 + h)(1  )  (1 + n) ~K [eg; ; h]
(32B)
After some algebraic manipulations we obtain the following well-dened sys-
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tem:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
bc0 =
(R+bc3)
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bc3
bc1 =
(1+n)(bc0+bc1 (1 )h ) (1 )h
p
 ( (bc0+bc2) (1+n)(R(1+)+bc3)
p
 + )
(1+h)(R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bc3)
bc2 =
h
p
 ((bc0+bc2)+(1+n)(R(1+)+bc3)
p
   )
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bc3
bc3 =  
R(1+n)(R(1+)+bc3)
R(+(1+n)(1+))+(+(1+n))bc3
Solving the system we obtain the following two solutions for  :
 c1 = bc13
k
1 + h
+ bc12
h
1 + h
+ bc11
1
1 + h
+ bc10 (33B)
where, under 
cR  (1+n)(1+)+(1+n) and 
cO(1 (1+n))+(1+n) :
bc12 =

p
 
R p  (

c
O +R
p
 
cR   
p
 );
bc11 =
h1 
R
R (1+n)2 + R
 

cO   h (1  ) 

;
bc13 =  R
cR;
bc10 = 

c
O;
and
 c2 = bc23
k
1 + h
+ bc22
h
1 + h
+ bc21
1
1 + h
+ bc20 (34B)
where:
bc23 =  R;
bc12 =  
;
bc11 = (1  ) h;
bc10 = 0
Note that the Eq. (33B) is equivalent to Eq. (34B) under the condition

cR = 1 and 

c
O = 0, which implies  =
1
1+n . Recall that, for the existence of
the x point, the condition  < 11+n , which induces 

c
O to be strictly greater
than zero, is required. Consequently the Eq. (34B) is not feasible.
Proof of Corollary (7).
Proof of Proposition (10). Let us rst consider the following normaliza-
tion of the relative Welfare weights, Eq. (3.18), after assigning    :

cR 
(1 + n) (1 + )
+ (1 + n)
and 
cO 
   (1 + n)
+(1 + n)
(3.30)
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Using the weights (3.30) and comparing the parameters of the policy rules
of Eq. (2.25) and Eq. (3.29) we obtain for any  <  where:
  1
2
0@  1  n q
(1+n)2( 1+2Rp   )( (1+2)2+2R(1+2(1+))p   )
 1+2Rp   
1A
the following inequalities must hold:
bc0 < b0 b
c
2 < b2
bc1 < b1 b
c
3 > b3
Then we conclude T [ht; kt] > Tc [ht; kt] for any (ht; kt) 2 p \c.
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3.9 Technical Appendix
3.9.1 Derivation of Pareto optimal allocation in steady states
To obtain the equilibrium value for et; using the economic Euler condition
and given the equivalence uc1;t = uc2;t we can rewrite the FOC with
respect the public education transfer as follows:
 Ruc1;t+1 +Hetuc1;t+1 = 0
After simplifying, we obtain:
Het = R) et =
1
1 + n

1  
R
 1
  
ht + (1  ) h

In equilibrium by implicit function theorem there exists a unique saving
function, kt+1, which satises the condition (3.6):
kt+1 =

(1 + n) (1 + )

(1 + ht) 

pt
1 + n
+ et (1 + n)

  1
(1 + n)R (1 + )
pt+1
Plugging the equilibrium saving choice into the FOC with respect the
pension transfer, we obtain:
  1
(1 + ht) 

pt
1+n + et (1 + n)

  (1 + n) kt+1
+ 
1
(1 + n)Rkt +
pt
1+n
= 0
Solving for pt :
pt =   (1 + n)
2
 + 
kt+1 R (1 + n)
2
 + 
kt+
 (1 + n)
 + 
ht  (1 + n)
2
 + 
et+
 (1 + n)
 + 
Fixing  = 12 and equating ht+1 = ht = h
; the following steady state
levels for the state variable H and education transfer are obtained:
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h =
(1  )
2 (1 + n)R  
h
e =
(1  )
4 (1 + n)R2   2R
h
Equating kt+1 = kt = k and solving simultaneously for k and p; we
get :
k =
 
4 (1 + n)R2   h (1 + n  2R) (1  )  2R (1 + n R)
2 (1 + n)R (2 (1 + n)R  ) (nR +  (n+ (R  1) (R   1)))
p =
(1 + n)
 
4 (1 + n)R2   h (1 + n  2R) (1  )  2R (R   1)
2 (2 (1 + n)R  ) (nR +  (n+ (R  1) (R   1)))
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